David Lanier, a Tennessee state chancery judge, was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 242 for willfully depriving five women of constitutional rights while acting under color of state law. The evidence, viewed favorably to the verdict, showed that Lanier sexually assaulted women in his chambers between 1989 and 1991, including two oral rapes of a woman whose divorce and daughter’s custody matters were subject to his court’s authority.
The indictment alleged that Lanier violated the women’s Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in bodily integrity, including the right to be free from willful sexual assault. The jury convicted him on seven counts and found that the two oral rapes caused bodily injury. The District Court imposed consecutive sentences totaling 25 years.
A Sixth Circuit panel initially affirmed. Sitting en banc, however, the Sixth Circuit reversed and directed dismissal of the indictment. It held that § 242 could support criminal liability only when the Supreme Court had previously recognized the asserted constitutional right in a factually “fundamentally similar” case. Because the court found no such Supreme Court precedent involving sexual assault by a state judge, it concluded that Lanier lacked constitutionally adequate notice. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the judgment, and remanded.
Issue #1
Whether due process permits criminal liability under 18 U.S.C. § 242 when the constitutional right allegedly violated was not previously recognized by the Supreme Court in a factually fundamentally similar case.
Holding
Yes. Section 242 may be applied when pre-existing law made the constitutional unlawfulness of the defendant’s conduct apparent; due process does not require a prior Supreme Court case with fundamentally similar facts.
Reasoning
Section 242 criminalizes a willful deprivation, under color of law, of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law. Because the statute incorporates broadly phrased constitutional guarantees by reference, its application must comply with due process’s requirement of fair warning: at the time of the conduct, the statute, either on its own or as authoritatively construed, must have made it reasonably clear that the conduct was criminal.
The Court identified three related fair-warning principles: vagueness doctrine, the rule of lenity, and the bar on unforeseeable judicial expansions of criminal statutes. Each asks essentially the same question: whether the defendant had reasonable notice that the conduct fell within the statute’s criminal prohibition.
Screws v. United States had already supplied the governing approach. Under Screws, § 242 reaches violations of rights made specific by the Constitution’s text, federal law, or judicial decisions interpreting them. A public official who willfully violates such a sufficiently definite right cannot claim punishment for violating an unknowable or undefined standard.
The Sixth Circuit imposed too rigid a factual-similarity requirement. Prior § 241 and § 242 cases had sustained convictions even though the precedent and the charged conduct were not identical. A prior case need not have addressed the precise mechanism or setting of the later constitutional violation if existing law nevertheless gave reasonable warning that the conduct was unlawful.
The Court rejected the idea that general legal rules can never provide criminal notice. Although some situations may require highly particular precedent—for example, where earlier authority expressly reserved the application of a general rule to the conduct at issue—a general constitutional rule can sometimes apply with obvious clarity. The absence of a prior case involving the exact same abusive act does not itself defeat fair warning.
Issue #2
Whether only decisions of the Supreme Court can make a constitutional right sufficiently specific to provide fair warning for a § 242 prosecution.
Holding
No. Decisions of lower federal courts and other relevant judicial authority may contribute to the fair-warning inquiry; Supreme Court precedent is not the exclusive source of notice.
Reasoning
Nothing in Screws limited relevant interpretive decisions to opinions of the Supreme Court. Although Screws illustrated its rule with Supreme Court decisions, it spoke more broadly of rights made specific by “decisions interpreting” the Constitution or federal law.
The Court’s later cases likewise did not establish an exclusive-Supreme-Court rule. In Anderson v. United States, for example, the Court referred to a Court of Appeals decision when defining the established constitutional right relevant to liability under the companion conspiracy statute, § 241.
Conflicting decisions among lower courts may bear on whether the law was clear enough to give fair warning. But that practical concern is addressed by evaluating the clarity of the law as a whole, not by categorically excluding all lower-court decisions from consideration.
Issue #3
Whether the fair-warning standard for criminal liability under § 242 is more demanding than the “clearly established” law standard governing qualified immunity in § 1983 and Bivens civil actions.
Holding
No. The two standards serve the same notice-based objective: liability may be imposed when, in light of pre-existing law, the constitutional unlawfulness of the conduct was apparent.
Reasoning
Qualified immunity protects officials from civil damages unless the contours of the right were sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that the conduct violated that right. That inquiry seeks to ensure that officials can reasonably anticipate when their conduct may create legal liability.
The Court saw no reason to demand greater clarity for § 242 than for qualified-immunity purposes. Both doctrines implement the same underlying fair-warning principle, protecting individuals against liability when the law did not provide adequate notice of its application.
Accordingly, the operative question is whether, in light of pre-existing law, the conduct’s constitutional unlawfulness was apparent. The Court did not decide whether Lanier’s conduct met that standard; it remanded because the Sixth Circuit had instead applied an erroneously heightened test.
Issue #4
Whether § 242 can encompass a state official’s sexual assault of a noncustodial victim as a deprivation of liberty without due process.
Holding
Yes. The Court rejected Lanier’s contrary arguments and confirmed that § 242 may enforce Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, including protection against assault by state officials outside a custodial setting.
Reasoning
The Court explained that Screws itself, together with later cases such as United States v. Price, foreclosed Lanier’s argument that rights protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause lie outside § 242. Section 242 is enforcement legislation that reaches deprivations of due process rights.
DeShaney v. Winnebago County did not aid Lanier. DeShaney generally limits an official’s affirmative constitutional duty to protect a person from private violence, absent custody or a comparable special relationship. It does not hold that a person lacks constitutional protection against an assault committed directly by a state official.
Graham v. Connor also did not exclude substantive-due-process analysis here. Graham requires courts to use a more specific constitutional provision when one directly governs the claim, such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment. It does not mean that every claim involving governmental physical abuse must arise exclusively under those amendments.