Caseflicks

Court of Appeals of Washington • 1988

Carr v. Deking

765 P.2d 40 | 52 Wash. App. 880 | 1988 Wash. App. LEXIS 632

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that a cotenant's lessee acquires the leasing cotenant's right to shared possession, so a nonjoining cotenant's ordinary remedy is partition—not ejectment.

Background

Joel Carr and his father, George Carr, owned Lincoln County farmland as tenants in common. From 1974 through 1986, they orally leased the land year to year to Richard Deking for a one-third crop share, with the Carrs paying one-third of fertilizer costs. In 1987, Joel sought a cash-rent arrangement, but Deking instead negotiated with George.

Without Joel's knowledge or consent, George and Deking signed a written 10-year crop-share lease. The new lease required Deking to pay all fertilizer costs. Joel neither authorized nor ratified it. Joel later gave Deking notice terminating his tenancy after the 1987 crop year and sued to declare the lease invalid, bar Deking from farming the land, and require him to vacate.

The trial court granted Deking summary judgment. It held that Deking could remain in possession under George's lease for 10 years or until partition, awarded Joel one-sixth of the crop and conservation payment, and required Joel to pay one-sixth of fertilizer costs. The court also struck portions of Joel's affidavit concerning George's mental capacity, denied a requested continuance, and denied Joel's later motions to amend and reconsider. Joel appealed.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether a tenant in common who did not join or consent to another cotenant's lease may eject the lessee from the commonly owned property.

Holding

No. A cotenant may lease that cotenant's own undivided interest, and the lessee may remain in copossession with the nonjoining cotenant unless and until the property is partitioned.

Reasoning

Each tenant in common has a right to use, possess, and benefit from the entire property, subject to the equal rights of the other cotenants. Because George possessed this right as to his undivided one-half interest, he could lease that interest to Deking without Joel's consent.

A lease by one cotenant does not bind the nonjoining cotenant as a contractual matter. But the lessee steps into the leasing cotenant's shoes and becomes, for the lease term, a tenant in common with the remaining owners. Deking therefore held George's right to shared possession, rather than the status of a trespassing stranger.

Joel could not demand exclusive possession against Deking. His remedy was to seek partition of the land, which would end or separate the parties' shared possessory relationship; until then, he could demand only copossession. The court found no basis to conclude that the land could not be physically partitioned.

Joel's notice purporting to terminate Deking's tenancy did not change the result because George, the cotenant who executed the lease, did not join in that notice. Nor did Joel's cited cases establish that a cotenant's lease of that cotenant's own interest was invalid.

Issue #2

Whether Joel's affidavit created a genuine issue of material fact concerning George's mental capacity to enter the 10-year lease, or justified a continuance to obtain more evidence.

Holding

No. The affidavit contained unsupported conclusions rather than facts showing incapacity on the date of contracting, and Joel did not establish grounds for a continuance.

Reasoning

Lay opinion about another person's mental condition may be admitted when grounded in the witness's personal observations. At summary judgment, however, conclusory assertions unsupported by concrete facts cannot create a genuine factual dispute.

Joel stated that George's mental capacity had substantially declined and that George appeared confused because he considered a five-year lease but signed a ten-year lease later that day. Those statements did not demonstrate an inability to understand or enter a contract. George was entitled to change his mind about leasing his own interest.

George's alleged inability to understand the lease terms six months after execution also did not establish his capacity when he signed it. The trial court therefore properly struck the conclusory portions of Joel's affidavit and found no triable incapacity issue.

A continuance under CR 56(f) requires a showing that a material witness exists and that there is a good reason the witness's affidavit could not be obtained in time. Joel did not make that showing, so the denial of a continuance was not an abuse of discretion.

Issue #3

Whether the trial court properly determined Joel's interim economic rights and obligations under the leases while the property remained unpartitioned.

Holding

Only conditionally. Joel may elect to be governed by either the prior oral lease or the Deking-George written lease until partition, but he must accept all terms of whichever lease he elects.

Reasoning

Because Joel could not eject Deking, the court had to address the parties' economic relationship during their continued copossession. Joel sought the favorable term of the written lease requiring Deking to pay all fertilizer costs while resisting the lease's other effects.

The appellate court held that Joel could elect to take the benefit of the written Deking-George lease until partition. But he could not selectively claim its benefits without accepting its corresponding burdens and terms.

If Joel instead elects to be governed by the earlier oral crop-share lease, the trial court's allocation of one-sixth of the crop and conservation payment to him, coupled with his obligation to reimburse one-sixth of fertilizer costs, remains in place. If he elects the written lease, the trial court must modify the judgment accordingly.