People v. Gauze

Although Penal Code section 459 broadly defines burglary as entry into a listed structure with intent to commit larceny or any felony, the court read the statute in light of burglary's common-law purpose. Common-law burglary protected habitation and occupancy against invasion, and a person could not burglarize his own dwelling. That principle applied to joint occupants as well as sole occupants because occupancy, not formal ownership, was the critical consideration.

California's burglary statute expanded the kinds of protected structures and eliminated the common-law requirements of nighttime entry and a breaking. But those changes did not transform burglary into a general enhancement for every felony committed indoors. By identifying particular structures, the statute continued to protect possessory interests in property; burglary still requires an entry that invades such an interest by someone who lacks a right to be there.

The court's cases permitting burglary convictions after entry through an open door or during business hours did not establish that the defendant's right to enter is irrelevant. In People v. Barry, a customer entering a store with felonious intent was outside the store's implied invitation, which extended only to lawful purposes. Similarly, permission to enter premises may be conditional. But Gauze's right to enter his own apartment was personal and unconditional: his roommates could not lawfully refuse him admission or eject him merely because he intended to commit a crime.

The burglary statute is directed at the particular danger created when an intruder enters a protected place: occupants may panic, resist, or be injured as a result of the invasion itself. Gauze's entry into his own residence created no such invasion of habitation. Miller was endangered by Gauze's armed assault, which was independently punishable, not by Gauze's mere return to his own apartment.

Treating entry into one's own home as burglary would also produce disproportionate and implausible results. A person could commit burglary simply by entering home intending to forge a check or use narcotics, even if the intended offense never occurred. Because burglary was complete upon entry and carried severe penalties, the court declined to read section 459 to create that result.

People v. Sears did not compel a contrary conclusion. Sears had moved out of the residence at issue, and any arguable right to enter his wife's separate property was conditional. The broad language in Sears suggesting that permission does not defeat burglary therefore could not override the central distinction between conditional access to another's premises and Gauze's unconditional right to enter his own home.

Penal Code section 1018 requires that every plea be entered by the defendant personally in open court. That rule applies to a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, so counsel could not enter the plea over Gauze's objection.

The court likewise could not impose an insanity defense on its own initiative. A presently competent defendant may withdraw an insanity plea if the decision is free, voluntary, and informed; it follows that a defendant cannot be forced to assert that plea in the first place.

The record showed that Gauze made an informed choice. He had twice been found competent to stand trial, was warned that his prior murder conviction and parole status made a prison sentence likely, understood that a state-hospital commitment could permit periodic review and eventual release, and nevertheless chose to proceed solely with an alibi defense. Neither the court nor counsel had authority to override that decision.

The court did not need to consider diminished capacity as to the reversed burglary count. As to assault with a deadly weapon, California law treated the offense as a general-intent crime, and diminished capacity was unavailable as a defense to general-intent crimes. Counsel therefore did not err by declining to present a legally unavailable defense.

The court stated that People v. Wingo had already resolved a materially similar challenge. It therefore affirmed the sentence on the assault conviction.