Whether the trial court erred by refusing to instruct the jury that an honest belief in a right to possess the automobile would negate larcenous intent.
Holding
Yes. The refusal was prejudicial error and required reversal and a new trial.
Reasoning
Although an owner can commit larceny by taking property from a person who has a special possessory right, such as a garageman with a lawful lien, larceny still requires an intent to steal. A taking made under an honest claim of right may therefore lack the fraudulent intent necessary for the offense.
The evidence provided a reasonable basis for the jury to consider Cude's claim of right. The garageman testified that Cude had asked to leave the car while he went to Salt Lake City to obtain money, and Cude offered an explanation for removing the car that was consistent with an effort to deal with the repair bill rather than an intent to steal from the garageman.
Cude expressly testified that, because he owned the automobile, he did not believe he was committing a felony by taking it temporarily. Whether that assertion was credible, sincere, or outweighed by contrary evidence was for the jury, not the court, to decide.
A general instruction requiring an intent to steal did not adequately present Cude's specific defense. When evidence permits an inference that property was taken under a claim of right, the defendant is entitled to an instruction distinguishing larceny from a mere trespass or other nonlarcenous taking. Denying that instruction deprived Cude of a fair opportunity to have the jury decide his only asserted defense.