Takeaway
In short, Romero preserves a trial court's power under Penal Code section 1385 to strike a Three Strikes prior in furtherance of justice, but requires an individualized, recorded justification and permits appellate review for abuse of discretion.
Jesus Romero was charged with possessing 0.13 grams of cocaine base. The information alleged two prior serious-felony burglary convictions that qualified as strikes, along with other prior convictions. If the two strikes were applied, Romero faced a third-strike life sentence; without them, his current drug-possession offense and prison-prior enhancements exposed him to a substantially shorter determinate term.
The trial court told Romero it was willing to consider striking the strike allegations if he pleaded guilty. Over the prosecutor's objection, Romero pleaded guilty, and the court struck the strike allegations on its own motion. The court then imposed a six-year sentence: the upper term for the drug offense plus three one-year prison-prior enhancements.
The district attorney sought mandamus. The Court of Appeal held that, in a Three Strikes case, a court could strike prior-conviction allegations only on the prosecutor's motion. It ordered the trial court to vacate the sentence and allow Romero to withdraw his plea. The California Supreme Court granted review.
Issue #1
Whether Penal Code section 1385 permits a trial court, on its own motion, to strike prior serious- or violent-felony allegations in a Three Strikes case in furtherance of justice.
Holding
Yes. Section 1385(a) authorizes a court to strike Three Strikes prior-conviction allegations on its own motion, provided the court strictly complies with section 1385 and acts within the limits of its discretion.
Reasoning
Section 1385(a) authorizes a judge, either on the judge's own motion or on the prosecutor's application, to dismiss an action in furtherance of justice. California precedent had long treated that authority as including the lesser power to strike a sentencing allegation, including an allegation of a prior felony conviction. Striking an allegation does not erase the conviction; it decides only that the defendant should not receive the increased punishment that would otherwise follow from that allegation in the case at hand.
The Three Strikes provisions require prosecutors to plead and prove qualifying priors, but section 667(f)(2) expressly permits a prosecutor to move to dismiss or strike a prior allegation in furtherance of justice “pursuant to Section 1385.” That express reference is most naturally read to preserve section 1385, including its authorization for judicial action on the court's own motion. The statute contains no clear language withdrawing that authority.
A court's section 1385 power survives unless the Legislature gives a clear contrary direction. The court rejected arguments that the Three Strikes law's “notwithstanding any other law” language, its mandatory-sentencing features, or section 1385(b)'s prohibition on striking serious-felony enhancements under section 667 clearly eliminated the court's power. The Three Strikes scheme is an alternative sentencing law, and its own text expressly contemplates action pursuant to section 1385.
The legislative history reinforced this reading. The Legislature considered, but did not adopt, language that would have allowed the court to strike a prior only on the prosecutor's motion. It instead retained the reference to section 1385. Given section 1385's well-known and contested role in sentencing law, the Court would not treat that reference as accidental or meaningless.
The Court acknowledged that the Three Strikes law was intended to limit judicial sentencing discretion. But it limited that discretion through specific prohibitions, such as barring probation, sentence suspension, diversion, and non-prison commitments. General evidence of a tough-on-crime purpose could not supply an additional restriction that the enacted text did not clearly impose.
Issue #2
Whether the Three Strikes law should be construed to give the prosecutor a veto over a trial court's decision to strike a prior-conviction allegation in furtherance of justice.
Holding
No. That construction would raise grave separation-of-powers concerns and is not required by the statutory language.
Reasoning
Under People v. Tenorio, once criminal charges are filed and a court's jurisdiction is properly invoked, the disposition of those charges is fundamentally a judicial responsibility. The Legislature may withdraw a court's power to dismiss particular allegations altogether, but it may not preserve that judicial power while conditioning its exercise on a prosecutor's consent.
The prosecutor's proposed interpretation would have the same practical effect as the statute invalidated in Tenorio: a judge who concluded that justice required striking a prior could not do so unless the prosecutor agreed. Calling the Three Strikes scheme an oversight mechanism for prosecutorial charging discretion did not change the reality that it would restrict judicial disposition of already-filed charges.
Courts must, where reasonably possible, construe statutes to avoid serious constitutional doubt. Because the Three Strikes provisions could reasonably be read as preserving section 1385 authority, the Court adopted that reading rather than a construction that would effectively give the executive branch a veto over a judicial sentencing decision.
Issue #3
Whether the trial court's order striking Romero's prior-conviction allegations was effective and, if not, what remedy was required.
Holding
No. The striking order was ineffective because the court did not state its case-specific reasons in the minutes as section 1385(a) requires; the judgment had to be vacated and Romero allowed to withdraw his plea.
Reasoning
Section 1385(a) requires that the reasons for a dismissal or striking order be set forth in an order entered in the minutes. This is a mandatory requirement, not a technicality: it permits meaningful appellate review and ensures that the public record shows why a court exercised this substantial power.
The minute order stated only that the court believed the Three Strikes statute was unconstitutional and violated separation of powers. That statement explained the court's view that it had authority to act under section 1385, but it did not explain why the interests of justice justified striking Romero's particular priors. It therefore did not satisfy section 1385(a).
A court's discretion under section 1385 is limited and reviewable for abuse. It must weigh both the defendant's constitutional interests and society's interest in the fair prosecution of properly charged crimes. It may not strike allegations merely for convenience, court congestion, a guilty plea, or personal hostility to the Three Strikes law; it must instead make an individualized judgment that accounts for the current offense, the defendant's background, and other pertinent circumstances.
Because the trial court's willingness to consider striking the priors materially influenced Romero's guilty plea, the appropriate remedy was to vacate the judgment and permit him to withdraw that plea. On remand, the court could reconsider whether to strike the allegations, but it had to record legally adequate, case-specific reasons if it chose to do so.