Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1993

Minnesota v. Dickerson

508 U.S. 366 | 113 S. Ct. 2130 | 124 L. Ed. 2d 334 | 1993 U.S. LEXIS 4018

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Takeaway

In short, this case recognizes a limited “plain-feel” doctrine, but suppresses contraband when an officer manipulates an item beyond what is necessary to determine whether it is a weapon.

Background

Minneapolis police saw Dickerson leave an apartment building known to the officers as a site of crack-cocaine trafficking. After making eye contact with a marked squad car, Dickerson abruptly changed direction and walked into an alley. The officers stopped him and conducted a patdown. The courts below found both the stop and the frisk justified under Terry v. Ohio, and Dickerson did not challenge those conclusions in the Supreme Court.

During the frisk, an officer felt a small lump in Dickerson's jacket pocket. The officer testified that he examined the lump with his fingers, sliding it around until he concluded that it was crack cocaine in cellophane. He removed a plastic bag containing crack cocaine and arrested Dickerson.

The trial court denied suppression, reasoning that contraband detected by touch could be seized under a “plain-feel” analogy to the plain-view doctrine. Dickerson was convicted. The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting a categorical plain-feel exception and concluding that, in any event, the officer had manipulated an item he knew was not a weapon. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve disagreement among courts about tactile seizures during a Terry frisk.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the case became moot when Dickerson completed diversionary probation and the drug charge was dismissed.

Holding

No. The case remained a live controversy because the diversionary disposition could produce collateral legal consequences.

Reasoning

Although Minnesota's diversion statute provided that the proceeding would not count as a conviction for most purposes, the statute required retention of a nonpublic record for use in later proceedings. Minnesota courts permitted use of that record if Dickerson later had legal difficulties, and federal sentencing law could count the diversionary disposition in calculating a future criminal-history category.

Those potential consequences meant that reinstating the drug charge could still affect Dickerson's legal position. The Court therefore had jurisdiction to decide the Fourth Amendment question.

Issue #2

Whether the Fourth Amendment permits police to seize nonthreatening contraband detected by touch during a lawful Terry protective patdown.

Holding

Yes. Police may seize contraband found through “plain feel” if, during a lawful Terry frisk, the object's contour or mass makes its incriminating character immediately apparent and the officer has probable cause to believe it is contraband.

Reasoning

Terry permits a limited patdown when an officer reasonably believes a suspect may be armed and dangerous. Its purpose is officer safety, not evidence gathering, and the search must remain strictly confined to discovering weapons that could harm the officer or others.

The Court drew an analogy to the plain-view doctrine. When an officer is lawfully in a position to perceive an item, its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and the officer has lawful access to it, the officer may seize it without a warrant. Michigan v. Long had already applied this principle to contraband found during a lawful protective vehicle search.

The same rationale applies to touch. If a lawful patdown reveals an object's identity through its contour or mass, recognizing the contraband causes no privacy invasion beyond the frisk already authorized to search for weapons. Requiring an officer to ignore such immediately identifiable contraband would serve little Fourth Amendment purpose.

Touch may be less reliable than sight in some circumstances, but that affects how often an officer can establish probable cause, not whether tactile discovery can ever justify seizure. The probable-cause and immediate-apparency requirements guard against speculative seizures and prevent a weapons frisk from becoming a general evidentiary search.

Issue #3

Whether the officer's seizure of the cocaine from Dickerson's pocket satisfied the plain-feel rule.

Holding

No. The officer obtained probable cause only after further manipulation of an object he already knew was not a weapon, exceeding the limited scope of a Terry frisk.

Reasoning

The Minnesota Supreme Court read the record to show that the officer did not immediately recognize the lump as cocaine. Instead, he squeezed, slid, and otherwise manipulated the pocket's contents after determining that the object posed no weapons threat.

Once the officer knew the lump was not a weapon, continued tactile exploration was unrelated to Terry's sole justification: protection of officers and bystanders. It was therefore an unauthorized search for evidence rather than a valid protective patdown.

The Court compared the case to Arizona v. Hicks, where officers acquired probable cause only by moving stereo equipment to inspect serial numbers. Just as moving the equipment was an additional unauthorized search, manipulating Dickerson's pocket was an additional search not justified by Terry or another exception to the warrant requirement. Because that search was unconstitutional, the resulting seizure of cocaine was unconstitutional as well.

Concurrences

Justice Scalia

Reasoning

Justice Scalia joined the Court's opinion but wrote separately to question Terry's underlying authorization of a frisk based on reasonable suspicion. In his view, Fourth Amendment reasonableness should be measured primarily by the understanding at the time of the Amendment's adoption, not by contemporary judicial policy judgments.

He found historical support for Terry's stop authority because common-law and statutory practice allowed the temporary detention of suspicious persons to require an account of themselves. But he found no clear common-law support for physically searching a person who had been temporarily detained but not arrested on probable cause.

Still, the validity of the frisk itself had not been challenged or argued in this case. Assuming the frisk was lawful under Terry, Scalia agreed that evidence incidentally and immediately discovered during it could be admitted; he therefore joined the majority in full.

Dissents

Chief Justice Rehnquist

Reasoning

Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Blackmun and Thomas, agreed with Parts I and II of the Court's opinion, including recognition of the plain-feel doctrine. He disagreed only with the Court's decision to affirm suppression on the existing record.

In his view, neither the trial court nor the Minnesota Supreme Court made sufficiently precise findings on the controlling factual question: whether the officer had probable cause to believe the lump was contraband while still acting within Terry's lawful bounds. The Minnesota Supreme Court had analyzed the case under its categorical rejection of plain feel, an approach the Supreme Court had now rejected.

Because the governing Fourth Amendment rule had changed, Rehnquist would have vacated the state judgment and remanded for the Minnesota Supreme Court to make or reconsider the necessary factual findings under the Court's newly announced standard.