Reno v. Flores

The Court carefully defined the asserted liberty interest. This was not a claim to freedom from shackles, jail cells, or all forms of custody. Children are ordinarily subject to some form of custody, and when parents or guardians are unavailable, government may assume custody or arrange for it. The claimed right was instead a right to placement with a willing private custodian rather than in a government-operated or government-selected child-care institution.

That asserted right was not fundamental. No tradition established a constitutional right of a child without an available parent, close relative, or guardian to private placement with an unrelated adult who was not the child's legal guardian. Recognizing such a right would also substantially federalize the administration of state orphanages and other child-care institutions.

Because no fundamental right was infringed, the regulation needed only a reasonable fit with a legitimate governmental purpose. The INS could reasonably seek to protect the welfare of children in its custody by relying on parents, close relatives, and legal guardians as presumptively appropriate custodians, while maintaining custody in licensed, humane shelter-care facilities when such persons were unavailable.

The Court rejected the claim that due process required a case-by-case determination of each child's best interests. The Constitution requires that minimum standards be met and that fundamental rights be protected, but it does not make the child's best interests the exclusive constitutional criterion for every governmental custodial decision. The agency could account for its limited child-placement expertise and resources when choosing among otherwise permissible ways to protect juveniles.

The conclusion was reinforced by Congress's broad immigration authority. Congress may detain aliens suspected of unlawful entry pending deportation proceedings, and the differing treatment of aliens and citizens, as well as the preference for close relatives and legal guardians over unrelated adults, survived rational-basis review. This facial challenge also required respondents to show that no set of circumstances existed under which the regulation could be valid; they did not do so.

After arrest, an INS examining officer who is ordinarily different from the arresting officer determines whether there is prima facie evidence of deportability and whether the juvenile should remain in custody or be released. The juvenile receives notice of the custody decision and may request that an immigration judge independently redetermine it. Further review is available through the Board of Immigration Appeals and federal courts.

Respondents' demand for a hearing on whether private placement would better serve each child's interests merely restated their unsuccessful substantive due process claim. Since institutional custody meeting the consent decree's humane conditions was constitutionally permissible, due process did not require a hearing to determine whether an unrelated private custodian might be preferable.

The Court also rejected the requirement of automatic immigration-judge review. On this facial record, it had not been shown that all detained juveniles were incapable of requesting review. Most were teenagers, had an opportunity to contact an adult outside the INS, and sometimes had contact with legal-services counsel. In addition, a waiver of review was revocable at a later point in the deportation process.

Although the regulations set no precise deadline for a requested immigration-judge hearing, the Court would not assume in a facial challenge that excessive delay would inevitably occur. The record contained no evidence of actual excessive delays under the new regulation.

Section 1252(a)(1) authorized the Attorney General, in her discretion, either to continue an arrested alien in custody or to release the alien on bond or parole. Under the Court's precedents, the regulation was valid if it rationally pursued a lawful agency purpose.

The agency's stated purpose was juvenile welfare, not merely administrative convenience. The INS reasonably concluded that it could not responsibly release children to just any adult and that it lacked the resources and expertise to conduct individualized home studies for every proposed placement. Administrative efficiency was not itself the end of the policy; it was a permissible reason for selecting a means of advancing child welfare.

The regulation reasonably relied on familiar custodial presumptions. Parents are ordinarily children's preferred custodians; close relatives have traditionally received special recognition; and state-appointed legal guardians have been vetted through state domestic-relations systems. When no such custodian was available, the INS could retain legal custody in a licensed shelter-care facility while continuing to seek a relative or guardian, with discretionary release to other adults in unusual and compelling cases.

The statute did not require fully individualized decisions about every proposed unrelated custodian. The INS made the individual determinations necessary to apply its rule: whether the child was deportable, under eighteen, had an available approved custodian, or presented an exceptional case. Generic rules and reasonable presumptions may coexist with individualized determinations under the immigration statute.

The regulation did not authorize indefinite detention. Custody was limited by the need to complete deportation proceedings with reasonable dispatch, and habeas corpus remained available for unreasonable delay. The record did not show that juveniles were being detained for unduly long periods under the regulation.