Whether an in forma pauperis complaint may be dismissed as factually frivolous under § 1915(d) only when judicially noticeable facts contradict its allegations.
Holding
No. A court may dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint as factually frivolous when its factual allegations are clearly baseless—that is, irrational, wholly incredible, fantastic, or delusional—even if no judicially noticeable fact directly disproves them.
Reasoning
Section 1915 seeks to give indigent litigants access to federal courts, but it also guards against abuse by permitting dismissal of frivolous or malicious suits. In Neitzke, the Court held that a complaint is frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact, and explained that § 1915(d) gives courts unusual authority to pierce the veil of factual allegations in a way that ordinary pleading rules generally do not.
The Ninth Circuit's judicial-notice rule was too restrictive because it required courts to accept any allegation that could not be conclusively rebutted from indisputable outside sources. That approach disregarded Neitzke's recognition that courts may dismiss claims resting on clearly baseless factual contentions.
The inquiry is nevertheless limited. Because a frivolousness ruling often occurs sua sponte before any answer or factual development, it cannot become a vehicle for resolving genuine factual disputes. The initial assessment must be weighted in the plaintiff's favor, and allegations cannot be dismissed merely because they seem unlikely or improbable.
The proper category is confined to allegations that rise to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible. The Court declined to turn that standard into a rigid formula, reasoning that district judges are best positioned to identify the fantastic or delusional claims with which they are familiar. The Court therefore vacated and remanded so the Ninth Circuit could apply this standard rather than its judicial-notice test.