Coleman v. Thompson

The independent-and-adequate-state-ground doctrine generally bars federal habeas review when a state court refuses to reach a federal claim because the prisoner failed to comply with a state procedural rule. Although federal habeas examines the lawfulness of custody rather than directly reviewing the state judgment, the doctrine serves comity and federalism by preventing prisoners from using habeas to evade state procedures and by preserving the States' opportunity to enforce federal rights in their own courts.

Michigan v. Long created a presumption favoring federal review when a state decision appears to rest on federal law or is interwoven with it, but the state ground is unclear. Harris adopted that same presumption for habeas cases. The presumption is justified in that defined setting because, ordinarily, an ambiguous decision that substantially discusses federal law most likely rests on federal rather than independent state grounds.

Coleman's broader reading of Harris would apply the presumption whenever a petitioner had presented federal claims to a state court. The Court rejected that approach because, where a decision does not appear to rest on federal law, presuming the absence of a state ground would too often cause federal courts to review claims despite a state judgment supported by an independent procedural basis. The resulting intrusion on state interests would outweigh any administrative savings.

Harris did not apply because the Virginia Supreme Court's order did not fairly appear to rest on federal law. The court expressly granted the Commonwealth's motion to dismiss, and that motion relied only on Coleman's failure to file a timely notice of appeal. The order made no reference to federal law.

Virginia treated the notice-of-appeal deadline as mandatory and unwaivable. Coleman's argument that Virginia sometimes considered constitutional claims before excusing a default did not establish that the rule depended on an antecedent determination of federal law. The authorities he invoked concerned extensions for petitions for appeal or exceptional circumstances involving the denial of a constitutional right to counsel on a direct appeal, not his late ministerial notice of appeal from state habeas.

The state court's statement that it acted after considering the papers filed, including merits briefs, created some ambiguity. But that ambiguity did not overcome the court's explicit grant of a motion based solely on untimeliness. Coleman did not seek review of the Fourth Circuit's conclusion that the rule was adequate, so the Court accepted adequacy and held that the procedural ground barred federal review unless an exception applied.

Fay v. Noia had allowed habeas review after a complete failure to appeal unless the prisoner deliberately bypassed state procedures. But later cases, including Francis v. Henderson, Wainwright v. Sykes, Engle v. Isaac, and Murray v. Carrier, applied cause and prejudice to a growing range of state procedural defaults and recognized the substantial state interests in orderly procedures, finality, and an initial opportunity to correct constitutional errors.

Those same interests are implicated when a prisoner defaults an entire appeal rather than a single claim. A complete failure to appeal deprives the state courts of the opportunity to review the claims just as surely as a failure to make a timely objection or raise a particular issue. Applying one uniform rule eliminates the irrational distinction between total defaults under Fay and partial defaults under Sykes and its progeny.

The Court therefore expressly displaced Fay's deliberate-bypass rule in this setting. The only remaining exceptions are a showing of cause for the default and actual prejudice from the asserted federal violation, or a showing that refusing review would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, ordinarily involving actual innocence.

Cause ordinarily must be an objective factor external to the defense that impeded compliance with the state's procedural rule. Attorney error generally is attributed to the client because counsel acts as the client's agent. Ineffective assistance can constitute cause only when the deficient representation itself violates the Constitution, because that constitutional violation is attributable to the State.

There is no constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings, including capital postconviction proceedings. Consequently, there can be no constitutionally ineffective assistance in those proceedings. Coleman therefore had to bear the risk that his state habeas appellate lawyer missed Virginia's filing deadline.

Virginia law at the time required some ineffective-assistance-of-trial-and-appellate-counsel claims to be raised initially in state habeas. The Court did not decide whether a special constitutional rule might apply where state collateral review is the first available forum for a claim. Coleman had received an evidentiary hearing in the state habeas trial court, however, and his default occurred on appeal from that court's judgment. He had no right to counsel on that collateral appeal, which was beyond the first appeal as of right. Coleman also did not argue that federal review was necessary to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice.