Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1989

Will v. Michigan Department of State Police

491 U.S. 58 | 109 S. Ct. 2304 | 105 L. Ed. 2d 45 | 1989 U.S. LEXIS 2975 | 57 U.S.L.W. 4677

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Takeaway

In short, Will holds that States, state agencies that are arms of the State, and state officials sued in their official capacities for state-paid relief are not § 1983 “persons,” though officials may still be sued for prospective injunctive relief to end ongoing federal-law violations.

Background

Ray Will alleged that the Michigan Department of State Police denied him a promotion to data-systems analyst because his brother had been a student activist and the subject of a police “red squad” file. Will sued in Michigan state court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, naming the Department and the Director of State Police in his official capacity. He alleged violations of the Federal and Michigan Constitutions.

After the Michigan Civil Service Commission found that the refusal to promote Will rested on partisan considerations, a state trial judge concluded that Will had established a federal constitutional violation. The judge allowed the Court of Claims action to proceed and held that the Department and the Director were “persons” subject to suit under § 1983.

The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the Department, as an arm of the State, was not a § 1983 “person,” and remanded as to the Director’s possible immunity. The Michigan Supreme Court agreed that the State was not a person under § 1983 and further held that a state official sued in an official capacity was not a person either. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review to resolve disagreement among lower courts.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether a State or a state agency that is an arm of the State is a “person” subject to liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Holding

No. Neither a State nor an arm of the State is a “person” within the meaning of § 1983.

Reasoning

The Court began with the ordinary meaning of “person.” In common usage, a statute’s use of that term does not ordinarily include the sovereign. Reading § 1983 to impose liability on “every person, including a State,” would be an awkward and insufficiently clear way for Congress to impose a new form of liability on States.

Federalism reinforced that reading. When Congress intends to alter the usual balance between the States and the Federal Government, it must state that intention unmistakably clearly. Section 1983 contains no clear statement that States themselves may be sued for damages or other relief.

The Court treated the Eleventh Amendment and the statutory question as distinct, but related, considerations. Although the Eleventh Amendment does not govern a suit filed in state court, Quern v. Jordan had established that § 1983 did not abrogate state sovereign immunity in federal court. Because § 1983 was principally intended to furnish a federal forum for civil-rights claims, the Court found it implausible that Congress silently created a cause of action against States available only in state courts—the very forums Congress sought to let civil-rights plaintiffs avoid.

The common-law backdrop pointed in the same direction. Congress is presumed not to displace well-established common-law immunities and defenses without specific language. Sovereign immunity—the principle that a State cannot be sued in its own courts without consent—was firmly established when Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871, and § 1983 did not clearly displace it.

Neither the legislative history nor the Dictionary Act changed the result. The Reconstruction Congress plainly intended to create a remedy for unconstitutional action taken under color of state law, but nothing in the debates showed a clear intent to make the States themselves liable. The Dictionary Act’s reference to “bodies politic and corporate” did not clearly establish that Congress meant to include sovereign States rather than public and municipal corporations.

Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, which recognized municipalities as § 1983 persons, did not compel a contrary result. Municipalities lack Eleventh Amendment protection and, by 1871, generally no longer possessed the States’ sovereign immunity. Monell was expressly limited to local governmental entities that are not arms of the State.

Issue #2

Whether a state official sued in his or her official capacity is a “person” under § 1983 when the suit is, in substance, against the State.

Holding

No, when the official-capacity claim seeks relief against the State itself, such as damages payable by the State. An official-capacity defendant may, however, be a person for a claim seeking prospective injunctive relief under Ex parte Young.

Reasoning

Although an individual state officer is literally a person, an official-capacity suit ordinarily is not a suit against the officeholder as an individual. It is a suit against the official’s office and therefore against the State itself.

The Court refused to let a plaintiff evade the rule excluding States from § 1983’s definition of “person” merely by naming a state officer in an official capacity. Because Will’s claim against the Director in that capacity was substantively a claim against Michigan, it could not proceed on the theory that the Director was a separate § 1983 person.

The Court preserved the established Ex parte Young distinction for prospective injunctive relief. An official sued to end an ongoing violation of federal law is treated as a person under § 1983 because that form of official-capacity action is not treated as an action against the State for sovereign-immunity purposes.

Dissents

Justice Brennan

Reasoning

Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, argued that the majority allowed Eleventh Amendment concerns to determine a statutory question in a case filed in state court, where the Eleventh Amendment does not apply. In his view, the ordinary task was to determine what Congress meant by “person” in § 1983, rather than importing the especially demanding clear-statement rule used to find abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity.

He maintained that the Dictionary Act supplied the proper starting point. Enacted shortly before § 1983, it provided that “person” could include “bodies politic and corporate” unless context required a narrower meaning. Historical sources, Brennan argued, treated States as bodies politic and corporate, creating a presumption that States fell within § 1983’s term “person.”

Nothing in § 1983’s text overcame that presumption, according to Brennan. The statute is specifically directed to deprivations committed under color of state law, which fits a statute aimed at state action. Any linguistic redundancy created by including States was no greater than the redundancy involved in treating municipalities as persons under Monell.

Brennan also read the Reconstruction history as supporting inclusion of States. Congress enacted the 1871 Civil Rights Act amid pervasive state failures to protect civil rights and violence in the former Confederate States. That historical setting, he argued, made it especially implausible that Congress meant to leave States outside the statute’s reach.

Finally, Brennan warned that the majority’s rule prevented a § 1983 action even if a State expressly consented to suit. He would have remanded for Michigan courts to decide whether Michigan had waived common-law sovereign immunity and whether it could deny a § 1983 remedy while allowing materially similar state-law constitutional claims.

Justice Stevens

Reasoning

Justice Stevens argued that the majority’s conclusion conflicted with the Court’s own treatment of official-capacity suits. The Court regularly recognizes that an official-capacity action is, in substance, an action against the State, particularly when prospective relief is sought to stop an ongoing violation of federal law. Once the Eleventh Amendment is set aside in a state-court action, Stevens reasoned, the State should be directly suable under § 1983 rather than reached through the fiction of naming an officer.

He emphasized that the Court had allowed prospective relief and attorney’s fees against States and state agencies in § 1983 litigation. Those decisions, in his view, reflected the practical recognition that States are the real parties responsible for official constitutional violations. The majority’s reading therefore produced an illogical distinction between state-level wrongdoing and comparable wrongdoing by counties or municipalities.

Stevens also objected to importing sovereign-immunity doctrine into statutory interpretation where it was not constitutionally necessary. Section 1983 was intended as a broad remedy for official violations of federal rights, and he would have held that a State may be named directly in a state-court § 1983 action.