Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1989

Maleng v. Cook

490 U.S. 488 | 109 S. Ct. 1923 | 104 L. Ed. 2d 540 | 1989 U.S. LEXIS 2309 | 57 U.S.L.W. 4537

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that an expired conviction does not itself create habeas custody merely because it enhances a later sentence, but a prisoner may challenge the later enhanced sentence when a detainer makes that future custody sufficiently certain.

Background

In 1958, Cook was convicted of robbery in Washington and received a 20-year sentence, which expired in 1978. While on parole, he incurred additional state convictions in 1976. In 1978, Washington imposed two life sentences and a 10-year sentence for those convictions. Under Washington’s indeterminate-sentencing system, the 1958 conviction increased the mandatory minimum time Cook would have to serve on the 1978 sentences.

Cook also received a 30-year federal sentence for bank robbery and conspiracy. He was serving that federal sentence in California when Washington lodged a detainer requiring that he be transferred to state custody to serve the 1978 state sentences after his federal term ended.

In 1985, Cook filed a pro se federal habeas petition identifying his 1958 conviction as the conviction under attack. He alleged that the conviction was unconstitutional because the state had failed to hold a competency hearing despite reason to doubt his competence. He also alleged that the expired 1958 conviction had unlawfully enhanced his later state sentences. The District Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, concluding that Cook was not “in custody” under the fully expired 1958 sentence. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the enhancement of the later sentences kept Cook in custody under the 1958 conviction.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether a prisoner is “in custody” under a conviction whose sentence has fully expired merely because that conviction enhanced a later sentence.

Holding

No. The expiration of the sentence ends custody under that conviction, even if the conviction later increases another sentence.

Reasoning

Federal habeas jurisdiction extends only to a person who is “in custody” in violation of federal law. The Court has read that requirement generously: physical imprisonment is unnecessary when a person remains subject to substantial restraints under an unexpired sentence, such as parole conditions. But those cases involved continuing restraints imposed by the sentence being challenged.

Carafas v. LaVallee distinguished jurisdictional custody from the collateral consequences that prevent a case from becoming moot. In Carafas, the petitioner was in custody when he filed, so his later unconditional release did not defeat the case. The Court explained that collateral consequences alone do not establish the statutory custody requirement when the challenged sentence had already expired before filing.

Treating an expired conviction as sufficient custody whenever it could enhance a later sentence would effectively erase the statutory limitation. Because habitual-offender laws and sentence-enhancement regimes are common, prisoners could attack long-expired convictions at any time through habeas corpus. The Court therefore held that Cook was not in custody under his 1958 sentence itself.

Issue #2

Whether Cook was nevertheless “in custody” under his unserved 1978 Washington sentences and could challenge those sentences as enhanced by the allegedly invalid 1958 conviction.

Holding

Yes. Washington’s detainer and Cook’s forthcoming obligation to serve the 1978 sentences placed him in custody under those sentences for habeas purposes.

Reasoning

Peyton v. Rowe overruled the older rule that habeas relief was available only for the sentence a prisoner was physically serving at the moment. Under Peyton, a prisoner serving consecutive sentences may challenge a later sentence that he has not yet begun to serve.

The fact that Cook was then serving a federal sentence rather than another Washington sentence did not change the result. Washington had lodged a detainer to ensure that federal officials would transfer him to state custody once his federal term ended. Under Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, a detainer based on an outstanding state basis for confinement can establish custody for habeas purposes.

Reading Cook’s pro se petition liberally, the Court concluded that it challenged the 1978 state sentences insofar as they were enhanced by the allegedly unconstitutional 1958 conviction. Thus, although Cook could not directly attack the expired 1958 sentence as a sentence under which he remained in custody, he satisfied the custody requirement for an attack on the later enhanced state sentences. The Court did not decide how far Cook could litigate the validity of the 1958 conviction in that later-sentence challenge.