During an argument while driving from Allen to Ada, Van Buskirk stopped her car in a low stretch of road between two hills and ordered her boyfriend, Robert Rose, out. Van Buskirk testified that Rose had slapped her and knocked off her glasses; as Rose walked around the front of the car, she accidentally pressed the accelerator, causing the car to strike him. She braked, throwing Rose to the ground, then drove away after seeing that he was beginning to get up.
A passing motorist found Rose lying in the roadway, moaning, and tried unsuccessfully to stop an approaching vehicle. That vehicle struck and dragged Rose, who died. Van Buskirk was charged with second-degree murder in Pontotoc County District Court. The jury convicted her of second-degree manslaughter and imposed a two-year prison sentence. She appealed, challenging the manslaughter instruction, other jury instructions, and the sufficiency of the evidence.
Issue #1
Whether the trial court erred by instructing the jury on second-degree manslaughter rather than treating negligent homicide as the exclusive applicable offense.
Holding
No. The second-degree manslaughter instruction was proper because Rose's death resulted from Van Buskirk's culpable abandonment of him in a dangerous roadway, not from driving in reckless disregard of others' safety.
Reasoning
Oklahoma's negligent-homicide statute had displaced the second-degree-manslaughter statute to the extent a death is caused by the operation of a motor vehicle, as recognized in Atchley v. State. But negligent homicide applies only where death is caused by driving a vehicle in reckless disregard for the safety of others.
The evidence did not make Rose a victim of negligent homicide. Although Van Buskirk's car initially struck him, the court viewed the legally significant wrongful act as her leaving him helpless in a travel lane after the collision.
Leaving Rose in a low place between hills, where approaching drivers might not see him in time, made a later collision reasonably foreseeable. That conduct fit the second-degree-manslaughter statute's reach over killings caused by another's act or culpable negligence that are not murder, first-degree manslaughter, excusable homicide, or justifiable homicide.
Issue #2
Whether the trial court committed reversible error by failing to instruct on proximate cause, justifiable homicide or self-defense, and circumstantial evidence.
Holding
No. Because Van Buskirk neither objected to the instructions given nor requested these instructions, the court reviewed only whether the instructions as a whole fairly covered the issues, and they did.
Reasoning
A defendant who does not object to jury instructions or request specific additional instructions ordinarily limits appellate review to whether the instructions actually given fairly presented the issues raised at trial.
After examining the charge as a whole, the court concluded that the instructions adequately covered the relevant subjects. Van Buskirk therefore showed no reversible instructional error.
Issue #3
Whether the court's instruction defining second-degree murder, followed by an instruction telling the jury not to consider that charge, unfairly prejudiced Van Buskirk.
Holding
No. The unusual sequence did not establish prejudice or deprive Van Buskirk of a fundamental right.
Reasoning
One instruction defined second-degree murder, while a later instruction explained that the trial judge had determined the evidence could not support a conviction for that offense and directed the jury not to consider it. The appellate court did not understand why the trial court used this approach.
Even so, Van Buskirk identified only speculation that the combination of instructions affected the jury. Without a demonstrated deprivation of a fundamental right or concrete prejudice, the court would not reverse on the basis of a bare assertion of error.
Issue #4
Whether the evidence was insufficient to submit the case to the jury, requiring the court to sustain Van Buskirk's demurrer, direct a verdict for her, or set aside the verdict.
Holding
No. The State presented a prima facie case of second-degree manslaughter, so factual disputes were properly left to the jury.
Reasoning
On a sufficiency challenge, the appellate court asks whether the State introduced a prima facie case. If it did, issues of fact and competing inferences are for the jury rather than the reviewing court.
The evidence supported an inference that Van Buskirk abandoned Rose in a roadway where a subsequent vehicle strike was foreseeable. That proof was sufficient to submit culpable negligence and causation to the jury, defeating her challenges to the demurrer, directed verdict, and verdict itself.