Whether a state judge has absolute judicial immunity from § 1983 damages liability for demoting and discharging a subordinate probation officer.
Holding
No. A judge's personnel decisions concerning court employees are administrative acts, not judicial acts, and therefore do not receive absolute judicial immunity.
Reasoning
Official immunity follows the function performed, not the title or status of the official performing it. Although immunity can protect public officials from litigation pressures that might distort the faithful exercise of their duties, absolute immunity is an exceptional protection. An official seeking it must show that compelling public-policy concerns justify it; otherwise, qualified immunity is generally the appropriate safeguard.
Absolute judicial immunity has a particularly strong historical basis for adjudicative acts. It protects judges from harassment by dissatisfied litigants, preserves independent and impartial decisionmaking, and avoids using damages actions as a substitute for ordinary appellate review. Those reasons apply most clearly when a judge resolves disputes between parties who have invoked the court's jurisdiction.
The Court's precedents distinguish adjudication from other functions that judges may perform. A judge's selection of jurors was treated as nonjudicial in Ex parte Virginia, and a state supreme court's promulgation of attorney-conduct rules was treated as legislative rulemaking in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union. These cases establish that an act does not become judicial merely because a judge performs it or because it is important to court operations.
Hiring, supervising, demoting, and firing court employees are administrative personnel decisions. They may be important to an effective court system, but they are not themselves acts of resolving cases or controversies. A judge who makes such decisions is functionally comparable to other public officials who hire and fire subordinates, and those officials do not receive absolute immunity for employment decisions.
The Seventh Circuit correctly recognized that fear of employee litigation might sometimes affect a judge's staffing choices. But that concern does not distinguish judges from executive officials facing similar suits, and it was not sufficiently grave to justify the extraordinary protection of absolute immunity. The Court left open whether White could assert qualified immunity and whether he was entitled to a new trial.