Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1987

Bowen v. Yuckert

482 U.S. 137 | 107 S. Ct. 2287 | 96 L. Ed. 2d 119 | 1987 U.S. LEXIS 2477 | 55 U.S.L.W. 4735

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Takeaway

In short, Bowen v. Yuckert upheld Social Security's step-two severity screen on its face, allowing denial without vocational analysis when a claimant fails to show a medically severe impairment, while leaving challenges to overly harsh application of that screen open for individual cases.

Background

Janet Yuckert applied for Social Security disability-insurance and Supplemental Security Income benefits in 1980. She alleged that inner-ear dysfunction, dizziness, headaches, vision-focusing problems, and flatfeet prevented her from working. She had previously worked as a travel agent and intermittently as a real-estate salesperson; she was 45, had a high-school education plus business-college and real-estate training, and was attending a demanding computer-programming course.

The state agency denied her claim initially and on reconsideration. An ALJ concluded that tests had not shown objective findings supporting a significant impairment and noted Yuckert's school attendance and driving. Applying the Secretary's step-two “severity” regulation, the ALJ found her impairments nonsevere and denied benefits without considering vocational factors. The Appeals Council declined review, and the District Court affirmed on substantial-evidence grounds.

The Ninth Circuit reversed without deciding whether substantial evidence supported the agency. It held that the Social Security Act required consideration of age, education, and work experience in determining disability and therefore did not permit denial based solely on a finding of medical nonseverity at step two. The Supreme Court granted review because the circuits were divided on the regulation's validity.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the Social Security Act authorizes the Secretary to deny a disability-benefits claim at step two when the claimant lacks an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits basic work activities, without considering age, education, and work experience.

Holding

Yes. The step-two severity regulation is facially valid and falls within the Secretary's statutory authority.

Reasoning

The Act gives the Secretary exceptionally broad authority to issue reasonable regulations governing the proof and decision of disability claims. Because Congress expressly delegated implementation authority, the Court's review asks whether the regulation exceeds statutory authority or is arbitrary and capricious. The severity regulation satisfied that deferential standard.

The statutory definition of disability requires an inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by reason of a medically determinable impairment. Step two uses the same functional premise: an impairment must significantly limit the abilities and aptitudes needed for most jobs. If an impairment does not significantly limit basic work abilities, it does not prevent substantial gainful activity within the meaning of the Act.

The Act also expressly permits the Secretary to require claimants to furnish medical and other evidence establishing disability. It was therefore reasonable to place on the claimant the threshold burden of showing a medically determinable impairment with sufficient medical severity before requiring a fuller vocational inquiry.

The history of the disability provisions supports a threshold medical-severity screen. The 1954 legislative reports stated that an impairment must have a nature and degree of severity sufficient to justify treating it as the cause of failure to obtain substantial gainful work. Soon after, the agency adopted a rule allowing medical considerations alone to support denial where the claimant had only slight abnormalities.

Section 423(d)(2)(A), which directs consideration of age, education, and work experience in deciding whether a person can perform other work, does not forbid step two. That provision restricts who may receive benefits: a claimant with a medically severe impairment must also show inability to do past work and other substantial work in the national economy. But a claimant who cannot first establish a medically severe impairment is not eligible, so vocational factors need not be considered.

The 1967 legislative history expressly contemplated a sequential inquiry: first, whether the claimant has a severe medically determinable impairment; next, whether the claimant can perform past work; and then, if necessary, whether the claimant can do other work in light of vocational factors. This sequence supported the Secretary's allocation of the burden of proof at step two to the claimant and at step five to the Secretary.

The 1984 Disability Benefits Reform Act removed any remaining doubt about the validity of an initial medical-severity determination. By requiring consideration of the combined effect of impairments in deciding whether there is a medically severe combination, Congress recognized that the Secretary could decide medical severity before considering vocational factors. The accompanying reports endorsed use of the sequential process to deny claims involving no impairment or only slight impairments that presumptively do not seriously affect work ability.

Step two also advances legitimate administrative goals. The Secretary processes millions of claims, and the screening step identifies claims in which slight medical abnormalities make disability unlikely regardless of vocational characteristics. Like the listings at step three, it promotes uniform and efficient administration; its facial validity does not resolve whether the agency applied it too harshly in particular cases.

Issue #2

Whether the Court should decide whether the Secretary validly applied the severity regulation to Yuckert's claim or whether the denial was supported by substantial evidence.

Holding

No. The Court decided only the regulation's facial validity and remanded for the Ninth Circuit to consider whether substantial evidence supported the agency's denial.

Reasoning

The Ninth Circuit invalidated the regulation on its face and therefore did not review the evidentiary basis for the ALJ's finding that Yuckert's impairments were not severe. Once the Supreme Court held the regulation facially valid, that unresolved substantial-evidence question had to be addressed below.

The Court acknowledged criticism that the agency had sometimes used step two to deny meritorious claims and noted the Secretary's later interpretive ruling intended to clarify the standard. But the record and the decision below did not present a proper basis for deciding the regulation's validity as applied or for invalidating the regulation as a remedy for alleged misapplication.

Concurrences

Justice O'Connor

Reasoning

Justice O'Connor agreed that step two is facially consistent with the Act. A claimant who cannot show a significant limitation in basic functions such as walking, seeing, understanding instructions, exercising judgment, responding appropriately at work, or adapting to routine changes cannot meet the statutory definition of disability. The Secretary may therefore screen out such claims before conducting a vocational analysis.

She wrote separately because substantial evidence suggested that the Secretary had systematically applied step two too broadly. Every regional court of appeals had either enjoined the regulation's use or adopted a narrowing construction, and denial rates at step two rose dramatically after the 1978 regulations. Those data supported the concern that claimants who could meet the statutory definition had been excluded prematurely.

In her view, step two is lawful only as a limited screen for slight abnormalities that do not significantly limit any basic work activity. If the adjudicator cannot clearly determine the impairment's effect on basic work activities, the process must continue to the later steps, including consideration of past work and, when appropriate, age, education, and work experience. Social Security Ruling 85-28 properly articulated that cautious approach.

Dissents

Justice Blackmun

Reasoning

Justice Blackmun maintained that the regulation directly contradicts the statute. Section 423(d)(2)(A) begins with the phrase “for purposes of” the basic definition of disability in § 423(d)(1)(A). Thus, it explains how to determine whether an insured worker's impairment creates an inability to engage in substantial gainful activity. When a claimant cannot do past work, the statute requires consideration of age, education, and work experience in determining capacity for other work.

The majority, he argued, improperly treated § 423(d)(2)(A) as a restriction on grants of benefits rather than a definition that also constrains denials. The statute creates an entitlement for insured persons who satisfy its criteria, and the Secretary cannot deny that entitlement through a regulation that omits factors Congress expressly required.

Vocational factors matter because the same medical impairment can have very different effects on different workers. A younger, well-educated worker with transferable skills may find other work despite an impairment, while an older worker with limited education and work experience may not. A medical-only severity determination cannot reliably decide whether an impairment is disabling for an insured worker.

Congress's distinct treatment of disabled widows and widowers reinforced this point. For that group, § 423(d)(2)(B) expressly permits disability determinations based solely on medical severity. Congress did not include comparable language for insured workers governed by § 423(d)(2)(A), indicating that it intended vocational factors to remain part of their disability determination.

The 1967 legislative history, in his view, confirmed that medical evidence had primary importance but did not eliminate individualized vocational analysis for workers unable to perform past work. The majority's reliance on 1954 history overlooked the later 1967 amendments that added the operative structure requiring consideration of vocational factors.

Justice Blackmun also rejected the view that the 1984 Reform Act ratified the regulation. That Act required consideration of combined impairments but did not prescribe the threshold level of severity or expressly approve a regulation that excludes vocational factors. Its legislative history showed concern that the agency had denied claims under an overly strict “slight impairment” approach.

Although a truly de minimis screening rule might possibly be permissible if it ensured that no claimant who could be disabled in light of vocational factors was screened out, the regulation before the Court did not do that. Its text expressly directed adjudicators not to consider age, education, or work experience, and evidence showed that step two had been applied systematically to deny potentially meritorious claims. He would have affirmed the Ninth Circuit's invalidation of the regulation.