Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1986

Murray v. Carrier

477 U.S. 478 | 106 S. Ct. 2639 | 91 L. Ed. 2d 397 | 1986 U.S. LEXIS 66 | 54 U.S.L.W. 4820

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Takeaway

In short, Murray v. Carrier holds that ordinary attorney negligence does not excuse a state procedural default; cause normally requires an external impediment or constitutionally ineffective, exhausted counsel claim, subject to a narrow actual-innocence exception.

Background

Clifford Carrier was convicted in Virginia state court of rape and abduction. Before and during trial, his appointed lawyer sought access to statements the victim had given police. The trial judge reviewed the statements in camera and denied discovery, finding no exculpatory evidence. After conviction, counsel listed the discovery ruling among the errors in a notice of appeal, but omitted it from the later petition for appeal required by Virginia procedure. The Virginia Supreme Court therefore did not consider the claim.

Proceeding pro se, Carrier later sought state and federal habeas relief, arguing that the prosecution had withheld material evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland. Virginia argued that his failure to raise the issue properly on direct appeal was a state procedural default. Carrier initially suggested ineffective assistance, but abandoned that as an independent claim on appeal and instead argued that his lawyer had simply overlooked the issue.

The Fourth Circuit held that an attorney's ignorance or inadvertence could establish “cause” to excuse a procedural default, unlike a deliberate tactical choice. It remanded for factfinding on why counsel omitted the claim and held that Carrier did not have to exhaust an ineffective-assistance claim in state court because he was using counsel's error only to establish cause. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the cause-and-prejudice rule applies when a state prisoner defaults a particular constitutional claim on direct appeal, rather than at trial.

Holding

Yes. A state procedural default on appeal is generally subject to the same cause-and-prejudice framework as a default at trial.

Reasoning

The Court had already indicated in Reed v. Ross that cause and prejudice applies to claims defaulted on appeal. Reed's recognition that a novel claim may supply cause for an appellate default would have been unnecessary if appellate defaults were outside the doctrine altogether.

Appellate procedural rules serve substantial state interests. They require defendants to present claims while the case is fresh, permit prompt review and possible retrial, promote efficient and accurate adjudication, and protect the finality of criminal judgments.

Those interests are impaired whether counsel omitted a claim intentionally or by mistake. An appellate omission deprives the state appellate court of the chance to correct the asserted trial error and undermines the State's ability to enforce its procedural rules. The Court therefore rejected a separate, more forgiving cause standard for appellate defaults.

Issue #2

Whether an attorney's inadvertent or ignorant failure to raise a claim constitutes cause for a procedural default.

Holding

No. Attorney error that does not amount to constitutionally ineffective assistance is not cause, whether the default occurs at trial or on appeal.

Reasoning

Engle v. Isaac established that counsel's failure to recognize a factual or legal basis for a claim, or counsel's failure to raise a claim despite recognizing it, does not itself establish cause. The Constitution guarantees a fair trial and competent counsel, not counsel who identifies every conceivable constitutional argument.

A prisoner ordinarily bears the risk of errors by counsel whose performance satisfies the Sixth Amendment standard of Strickland v. Washington. The relevant inquiry is not whether counsel erred, or whether the error was tactical rather than inadvertent, but whether an objective factor external to the defense impeded compliance with the state rule.

The Fourth Circuit's distinction between deliberate choices and inadvertent omissions was both unworkable and costly. It would require federal habeas courts to conduct frequent inquiries into counsel's subjective motivations, even though the State suffers the same loss of finality and opportunity for review regardless of why counsel failed to comply.

Issue #3

What kinds of circumstances can establish cause, and whether ineffective assistance may be invoked as cause without first being presented to state courts.

Holding

Cause ordinarily requires an objective external impediment; ineffective assistance can qualify as cause, but it generally must first be exhausted in state court as an independent claim.

Reasoning

The Court identified examples of external impediments: the factual or legal basis of a claim was not reasonably available to counsel, or official interference made compliance with the state rule impracticable. These circumstances differ from ordinary attorney mistake because they obstruct counsel from outside the defense.

Constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel also constitutes cause because the Sixth Amendment prohibits the State from obtaining a conviction when a defendant lacked adequate legal representation. But a petitioner ordinarily must first give state courts an opportunity to adjudicate that independent constitutional claim.

Exhaustion does not apply merely because a federal court must decide a federal-law question concerning cause. It does apply when deciding cause would require the federal court to decide an unexhausted ineffective-assistance claim on the merits. Carrier neither alleged an external impediment nor maintained an ineffective-assistance claim.

Issue #4

Whether a federal habeas court may review a procedurally defaulted claim without cause when enforcing the default would leave an actually innocent person imprisoned.

Holding

Yes, in an extraordinary case, a federal habeas court may grant relief without cause if a constitutional violation probably resulted in the conviction of an actually innocent person.

Reasoning

The Court reaffirmed that cause and actual prejudice normally operate conjunctively. It rejected the argument that the fundamental importance of the underlying constitutional right, or a showing of prejudice alone, generally eliminates the need to show cause.

Nonetheless, principles of comity and finality must yield in the extraordinary case of a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The Court recognized a narrow exception where a constitutional violation probably produced the conviction of someone who is actually innocent.

Because Carrier alleged that withheld victim statements might bear on his innocence, the Court remanded for examination of those statements. Unless they contained material establishing actual innocence, his defaulted Brady claim had to be dismissed for lack of cause.

Concurrences

Justice Stevens

Reasoning

Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, concurred in the judgment because he agreed that the case should return to the District Court for examination of the victim's statements. In his view, a claim that the State withheld evidence potentially bearing on innocence cannot be evaluated without knowing what that evidence says.

He disagreed with the majority's rigid account of cause and prejudice. Habeas corpus, he argued, is an equitable remedy whose statutory mission is to dispose of cases as “law and justice require.” Cause and prejudice should therefore be components of a broader inquiry into fundamental fairness, not inflexible, independent barriers to review.

Stevens gave special weight to the difference between a trial default and an appellate default. A contemporaneous-objection rule helps make the trial the principal setting for resolving errors, whereas an appellate default primarily serves finality interests. In his view, finality alone should not defeat a meritorious constitutional claim that may show the prisoner is innocent.

He agreed that appellate defaults normally matter, but maintained that federal habeas courts must preserve an exception for manifest injustice. He declined to endorse the majority's newly stated requirement that Carrier prove a constitutional violation probably caused the conviction of an actually innocent person, believing that the issue had not been fully briefed and should await review of the statements.

Dissents

Justice Brennan

Reasoning

Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, argued that counsel's inadvertent failure to follow a state procedural rule should establish cause. A deliberate tactical decision may fairly be attributed to the defendant, but an accidental omission does not show an intentional circumvention of state procedures.

In Brennan's view, a state procedural rule has little specific deterrent force when counsel's failure to comply was inadvertent. The incremental state interest in penalizing accidental lawyer error is too weak to justify withholding the federal habeas review that Congress authorized, especially when the prisoner can show that the underlying constitutional violation prejudiced the verdict.

He understood procedural-default doctrine as a narrow form of abstention from otherwise proper federal habeas jurisdiction. Because abstention is exceptional, federal courts should balance the prisoner's interest in vindicating federal rights against the State's concrete interest in enforcing its procedures, rather than apply an expansive and categorical definition of cause.

Brennan also criticized the Court's broader cause-and-prejudice doctrine as inconsistent with the historic role of the Great Writ. Although he agreed that the majority's actual-innocence exception narrowed the harshness of the rule, he believed comity and finality should yield well before a prisoner can prove actual innocence.