Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1985

Hill v. Lockhart

474 U.S. 52 | 106 S. Ct. 366 | 88 L. Ed. 2d 203 | 1985 U.S. LEXIS 141 | 54 U.S.L.W. 4006

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Takeaway

In short, Hill makes Strickland’s deficient-performance-and-prejudice test the governing standard for ineffective-assistance challenges to guilty pleas, requiring a defendant to show that competent advice would probably have led him to reject the plea and go to trial.

Background

William Lloyd Hill pleaded guilty in Arkansas state court to first-degree murder and theft of property. Under a plea agreement, the State recommended concurrent sentences of 35 years for murder and 10 years for theft. Hill signed a plea statement saying he understood the charges and consequences of his plea, had discussed the agreement with counsel, and was satisfied with counsel’s advice. At the plea hearing, the judge imposed the recommended sentences and stated that Hill would have to serve at least one-third of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole.

More than two years later, Hill sought federal habeas relief. He alleged that his lawyer had told him he would be eligible for parole after serving one-third of his sentence, but Arkansas classified him as a second offender because of a prior Florida felony conviction. As a result, he actually had to serve one-half of his sentence before becoming parole eligible. Hill asked for a sentence reduction that would restore his expected parole date.

The Federal District Court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing. It reasoned that parole eligibility was a collateral consequence of a guilty plea and that neither the court nor counsel was constitutionally required to give accurate parole information. A divided Eighth Circuit panel affirmed, and the en banc court likewise affirmed by an equally divided vote. The Supreme Court granted review because the result conflicted with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Strader v. Garrison.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the Strickland v. Washington two-part test governs ineffective-assistance claims challenging the validity of a guilty plea.

Holding

Yes. A defendant attacking a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance must establish both deficient performance and prejudice under Strickland.

Reasoning

A guilty plea is constitutionally valid when it represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternatives available to the defendant. When a represented defendant claims that counsel made the plea involuntary or unintelligent, the claim concerns whether counsel’s advice fell within the constitutionally required range of professional competence under McMann v. Richardson and Tollett v. Henderson.

Strickland requires a defendant to show that counsel performed below an objective standard of reasonableness and that there is a reasonable probability that the lawyer’s errors changed the result of the proceeding. Although Strickland itself involved a capital sentencing proceeding, the Court held that its two-part framework applies equally to ineffective-assistance claims arising from plea bargaining and plea entry.

The prejudice requirement is especially important because not every professionally unreasonable error affects the judgment. Requiring prejudice also protects the strong interest in the finality of guilty pleas, which resolve the overwhelming majority of criminal cases and should not be set aside for errors that made no practical difference.

Issue #2

What must a defendant show to establish Strickland prejudice when alleged ineffective assistance led to a guilty plea.

Holding

The defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.

Reasoning

In the plea context, prejudice focuses on whether deficient legal advice affected the outcome of the plea process itself. The necessary showing is not merely that counsel gave bad advice, but that correct advice would probably have caused the defendant to reject the plea and choose a trial instead.

The inquiry may require an objective assessment of the likely consequences of going to trial. For example, when counsel allegedly failed to investigate exculpatory evidence or advise the defendant of a viable defense, courts must consider whether that evidence or defense likely would have altered counsel’s recommendation and the defendant’s decision to plead.

Issue #3

Whether Hill alleged sufficient prejudice from counsel’s alleged erroneous parole-eligibility advice to require an evidentiary hearing.

Holding

No. Hill did not allege that accurate parole advice would have led him to reject the plea and insist on a trial, so he failed to allege Strickland prejudice.

Reasoning

The Court did not decide whether incorrect advice about parole eligibility can, in some circumstances, constitute constitutionally deficient performance. Instead, it resolved the case on Strickland’s prejudice prong, because Hill’s allegations did not state the required connection between the alleged error and his decision to plead guilty.

Hill did not allege in his habeas petition that, had he known he would have to serve one-half rather than one-third of his sentence before parole eligibility, he would have pleaded not guilty and gone to trial. Nor did he allege special facts showing that parole eligibility was a particularly important factor in his plea decision.

Hill’s mistaken assumption about parole eligibility would also have affected his estimate of time served if he had gone to trial and been convicted. Without an allegation that correct information would have changed his choice between the plea and trial, the District Court properly denied habeas relief without holding an evidentiary hearing.

Concurrences

Justice White

Reasoning

Justice White, joined by Justice Stevens, agreed that Hill was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing but would have reached that result on the deficient-performance prong rather than the prejudice prong. In White’s view, the critical fact was Hill’s plea statement, which listed zero prior convictions. Hill never alleged that he told counsel about his earlier Florida felony conviction, and it was therefore implausible that counsel knew Hill was subject to Arkansas’s second-offender parole rule.

Without an allegation that counsel knew of the prior conviction yet gave incorrect parole advice, Hill had not alleged facts showing objectively unreasonable representation. An attorney cannot be faulted for failing to apply a recidivist parole provision when the client apparently failed to disclose the conviction that triggered it.

Justice White disagreed with the majority’s suggestion that Hill had inadequately pleaded prejudice. Hill expressly alleged that parole eligibility was a critical factor in his decision and that he would not have accepted the negotiated plea had he been correctly advised. White concluded that, if Hill had alleged counsel’s knowledge of the prior conviction, those allegations would have justified a hearing to determine both ineffective assistance and prejudice.