Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1985

United States v. Hensley

469 U.S. 221 | 105 S. Ct. 675 | 83 L. Ed. 2d 604 | 1985 U.S. LEXIS 34 | 53 U.S.L.W. 4053

Full access

Unlock the video and quiz

The written brief is free to read below. Subscribe to watch the video explainer and take the quiz.

Create an account Log in

Takeaway

In short, this case permits a brief Terry stop to investigate a completed felony and allows officers to rely on another department's flyer, but only when the issuing department had reasonable suspicion and the resulting detention stays within Terry's narrow limits.

Background

After two armed men robbed a tavern in St. Bernard, Ohio, an informant told a St. Bernard officer that Thomas Hensley had driven the getaway car. The informant gave a written statement containing detailed information about the robbery and admitted tangential involvement. Based on that information, St. Bernard police circulated a wanted flyer stating that Hensley was wanted for investigation of an aggravated robbery, requesting that other departments pick him up and hold him, and warning that he might be armed and dangerous.

Six days after the flyer was received in nearby Covington, Kentucky, Covington officers saw Hensley driving. While a dispatcher unsuccessfully tried to determine whether an arrest warrant had issued, an officer stopped Hensley's car with flashing lights. Because the flyer reported that Hensley could be armed and dangerous, the officer approached with his revolver drawn and directed Hensley and his passenger out of the car. Another officer saw a revolver in plain view under the passenger seat. Police arrested the passenger, searched the passenger compartment, found two more guns, and then arrested Hensley.

Hensley, a convicted felon, was federally charged with possessing firearms. The District Court denied his suppression motion and convicted him after a bench trial. The Sixth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Terry investigative stops were limited to ongoing or imminent crimes and that the Covington officers could not rely on the St. Bernard flyer without knowing the facts supporting it. The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether police may make a Terry stop based on reasonable suspicion that a person was involved in a completed felony, rather than an ongoing or imminent crime.

Holding

Yes. Police may briefly stop a person reasonably suspected, on specific and articulable facts, of involvement in a completed felony to investigate that suspicion.

Reasoning

The Fourth Amendment asks whether a seizure is reasonable, which requires balancing the intrusion on personal security against the governmental interests served. Terry's reasonable-suspicion standard is not confined by an inflexible rule to crimes that are presently occurring or about to occur. Earlier decisions had indicated that officers may act on reasonable suspicion that a person has been, is, or is about to be involved in criminal activity.

A stop to investigate a completed crime may lack some of the urgency associated with preventing an imminent offense. But it advances a substantial governmental interest in solving crimes and promptly bringing offenders to justice. Requiring officers to wait for probable cause could impede an investigation and allow a suspect to flee before police can identify or question the person.

The Court limited its holding to completed felonies. When a person is reasonably suspected of involvement in a felony, especially one threatening public safety, the public interest generally outweighs the intrusion of a brief detention no more extensive than a permissible Terry stop. The Court did not decide whether reasonable suspicion would justify stops to investigate every completed offense, regardless of seriousness.

Issue #2

Whether officers may rely on a wanted flyer issued by another police department without personally knowing the specific facts that established reasonable suspicion.

Holding

Yes, if the issuing department had reasonable suspicion supported by specific and articulable facts, and the stop made in reliance on the flyer was no more intrusive than the issuing department itself could have made.

Reasoning

The Court applied the principle underlying Whiteley v. Warden: officers asked to assist another department may ordinarily act on a police bulletin without independently learning the supporting facts. In a mobile society, effective law enforcement depends on allowing officers to rely promptly on information transmitted by fellow officers rather than requiring them to re-investigate its factual basis at the scene.

A flyer cannot itself create lawful grounds for a stop if the issuing department lacked reasonable suspicion. The validity of evidence obtained during a stop therefore depends on whether the department that issued the flyer possessed facts sufficient to justify a Terry stop, not on whether the officer making the stop personally knew those facts.

The flyer must also be read objectively. If its objective meaning would lead an experienced officer to understand that the person is wanted in connection with an offense, it can support a brief stop to check identification, ask questions, or maintain the status quo while obtaining further information. The actual stop must remain within the scope and intrusiveness that the issuing department could lawfully have imposed.

Issue #3

Whether the St. Bernard flyer and the Covington officers' stop of Hensley satisfied the Fourth Amendment.

Holding

Yes. St. Bernard police had reasonable suspicion that Hensley participated in an armed robbery, and the Covington officers' brief, safety-conscious stop reasonably relied on the flyer and led to admissible evidence.

Reasoning

The informant's detailed knowledge of the robbery, together with her admission of tangential participation, gave her information sufficient indicia of reliability. Those facts supplied St. Bernard police with reasonable suspicion, though the Court assumed without deciding that they did not establish probable cause to arrest Hensley.

The flyer objectively indicated that Hensley was wanted for questioning and investigation in connection with an aggravated robbery. Because an experienced officer could also reasonably suppose that a warrant might have issued after the flyer was circulated, the Covington officers could briefly detain Hensley while checking on the warrant. The Court stressed that the legality of the stop turned on what actually occurred, not on the officers' subjective intention to hold Hensley for a longer period.

The officers were entitled to take reasonable measures to protect themselves and preserve the status quo because Hensley was reported to be armed and dangerous. Once an officer saw a gun in plain view, police had probable cause to arrest the passenger and could search the passenger compartment. The additional guns discovered in that lawful search gave probable cause to arrest Hensley, and his detention between the stop and arrest was brief.

The Court did not approve the flyer's broader request that other departments 'pick up and hold' Hensley for St. Bernard. A prolonged detention at the scene or police station could exceed Terry's limits. The Court held only that this particular brief stop, as actually conducted, was permissible.

Concurrences

Justice Brennan

Reasoning

Justice Brennan joined the Court's opinion but emphasized that even a short investigative stop seriously implicates the Fourth Amendment interest in personal privacy. Terry permits a balancing approach only because such stops form a special category of seizures substantially less intrusive than full arrests.

That balancing approach does not govern a detention that is functionally a full-scale arrest. Once an intrusion rises to that level, the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause rather than a case-by-case balancing of governmental and individual interests.