Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1984

Solem v. Bartlett

465 U.S. 463 | 104 S. Ct. 1161 | 79 L. Ed. 2d 443 | 1984 U.S. LEXIS 34 | 52 U.S.L.W. 4257

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that opening reservation land to settlement does not shrink a reservation unless Congress clearly says so; ambiguous text, history, and later practice leave the land within Indian country.

Background

In 1908, Congress authorized the Secretary of the Interior to sell and dispose of approximately 1.6 million acres of surplus, unallotted land within the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation. The land was opened to non-Indian settlement, but Congress did not expressly state that it was changing the reservation’s boundaries.

In 1979, South Dakota prosecuted John Bartlett, an enrolled member of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, for attempted rape committed in the area opened under the 1908 Act. Bartlett pleaded guilty and received a 10-year state sentence. After exhausting state remedies, he sought federal habeas relief, arguing that the crime occurred in Indian country and that South Dakota therefore lacked criminal jurisdiction over him.

The Federal District Court agreed and issued the writ. The en banc Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that the 1908 Act had opened land for settlement but had not diminished the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation. Because the South Dakota Supreme Court had interpreted the Act differently in prior cases, the Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the Eighth Circuit.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the Act of May 29, 1908, diminished the boundaries of the Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation when it opened surplus lands to non-Indian settlement.

Holding

No. The 1908 Act opened land for sale and settlement but did not clearly express Congress’s intent to diminish the reservation.

Reasoning

Only Congress may diminish an Indian reservation, and diminishment will not be lightly inferred. Once Congress has set land aside as a reservation, the land remains within the reservation despite changes in ownership of individual parcels unless Congress clearly indicates that it intends to alter the reservation’s boundaries.

The statutory text supplied no clear indication of cession or boundary change. Rather than providing that the Tribe would “cede, sell, relinquish and convey” the land, the Act merely authorized the Secretary to “sell and dispose” of it and directed that sale proceeds be credited to the Indians. That language resembles a sales-agency arrangement, not an immediate and complete surrender of tribal interests.

Other provisions of the Act supported the conclusion that the opened area would remain part of the reservation. Congress authorized land in the opened territory to be retained for Indian agency, school, and religious purposes; allowed tribal members to obtain allotments there before opening; and withheld coal-bearing lands from disposal for the Tribe’s benefit. Those provisions make sense if Congress expected the area to remain connected to the reservation.

The State relied on isolated references to “reservations thus diminished” and to land remaining in the “public domain.” Those phrases could support a contrary inference, but they were ambiguous and could refer to a reduction in commonly held tribal land rather than a legal reduction in reservation boundaries. They could not overcome the absence of a clear congressional statement of diminishment.

The circumstances surrounding enactment also did not establish that Congress understood the Tribe to be ceding land or that Congress intended a boundary change. The Act did not rest on a formal tribal agreement to cede territory, Inspector McLaughlin lacked formal tribal approval for the proposal, and the legislative debates centered chiefly on compensation and land disposition rather than jurisdiction or reservation boundaries.

Later governmental and judicial treatment of the opened area was inconsistent and thus carried little interpretive weight. More importantly, the opened lands did not lose their Indian character: many tribal members received allotments there, tribal government and services remained strongly present, roughly two-thirds of enrolled tribal members lived in the area, and the population was approximately evenly divided between Indian and non-Indian residents. This history did not support an inference of de facto diminishment.

Because neither the Act, its legislative history, nor subsequent events provided substantial and compelling evidence of congressional intent to diminish the reservation, the governing presumption against diminishment controlled. The original Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation boundaries therefore survived the 1908 opening.

Issue #2

Whether South Dakota had criminal jurisdiction over Bartlett, an enrolled tribal member, for an offense committed in the opened portion of the reservation.

Holding

No. Because the opened area remained within the reservation, it remained Indian country, and South Dakota lacked jurisdiction over Bartlett’s offense.

Reasoning

Under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a), all land within the limits of an Indian reservation is Indian country notwithstanding the issuance of patents to non-Indians. Thus, the fact that the 1908 Act permitted non-Indians to acquire land in the opened area did not itself remove that area from Indian country.

For crimes by Indians in Indian country, federal law assigns jurisdiction over specified major offenses to the federal government, while state criminal jurisdiction is generally limited. Since Bartlett was an enrolled tribal member and the offense occurred within the undiminished reservation, South Dakota could not validly prosecute him.

The District Court properly granted habeas relief, and the Eighth Circuit properly affirmed that judgment, because Bartlett’s state conviction rested on the mistaken premise that the 1908 Act had removed the crime site from the reservation.