Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1983

Jones v. Barnes

463 U.S. 745 | 103 S. Ct. 3308 | 77 L. Ed. 2d 987 | 1983 U.S. LEXIS 105 | 51 U.S.L.W. 5151

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Takeaway

In short, Jones v. Barnes holds that appellate counsel may use professional judgment to select the strongest issues and is not constitutionally required to raise every nonfrivolous claim requested by the client.

Background

David Barnes was convicted in New York of first- and second-degree robbery and second-degree assault after the victim identified him as one of four men who robbed and beat him. Appointed appellate counsel, Michael Melinger, consulted Barnes about potential appellate claims, chose three issues to brief and argue, and declined to press several other claims Barnes had suggested. Melinger also submitted Barnes's pro se brief, and Barnes later filed additional pro se briefs raising further issues.

The New York Appellate Division affirmed Barnes's conviction, and further state review was denied. After unsuccessful habeas litigation on other grounds, Barnes filed a second federal habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The District Court rejected the claim, concluding that appellate counsel need not argue every conceivable issue and may professionally select the strongest arguments. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that appointed counsel must argue every "colorable" issue the client requests, even if counsel believes it unwise. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Second Circuit.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the Constitution requires appointed appellate counsel to raise every nonfrivolous issue that a criminal defendant asks counsel to present on a first appeal as of right.

Holding

No. An indigent defendant has no constitutional right to compel appointed appellate counsel to press every nonfrivolous issue the defendant requests when counsel reasonably decides, as a matter of professional judgment, not to raise it.

Reasoning

The Court distinguished the defendant's ultimate authority over certain fundamental decisions—such as whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, testify, or take an appeal—from counsel's authority over the professional conduct of an appeal. Although an indigent appellant is entitled to counsel when a State provides a first appeal as of right, that entitlement does not make the client the constitutional decisionmaker on every appellate issue.

The Second Circuit relied on Anders v. California, but the Court found that reliance misplaced. Anders requires appointed counsel to act as an advocate and prevents counsel from withdrawing from a nonfrivolous appeal simply because counsel sees no merit in it. It does not require counsel to advance each nonfrivolous argument a client identifies after counsel has undertaken a professional evaluation of the record and the law.

Effective appellate advocacy depends on selectivity. Experienced advocates commonly winnow weaker arguments and focus on a small number of promising issues, because a proliferation of claims can dilute strong arguments, signal a lack of confidence in any particular claim, and make it harder for judges to identify the issues that matter most.

That professional judgment is especially important under the page and time limits common in appellate courts, but the point does not depend on such limits. A rule requiring counsel to present every colorable client-requested claim would force lawyers to bury potentially decisive arguments among weaker contentions and would undermine, rather than promote, the vigorous advocacy that the right to counsel is meant to secure.

The Court did not decide whether a lawyer's refusal to raise a requested claim could later constitute cause excusing a procedural default in federal habeas corpus. The only question presented was whether the Constitution itself imposes a per se duty on appellate counsel to brief every nonfrivolous issue requested by the client.

Concurrences

Justice Blackmun

Reasoning

Justice Blackmun agreed that Barnes received constitutionally adequate appellate representation and therefore agreed with the judgment. He declined to join the Court's opinion, however, because he saw no need to state that there is no constitutional right to a criminal appeal, a proposition he considered unnecessary to resolve this case.

In Justice Blackmun's view, the better ethical rule is that, after counsel gives candid advice about the most promising appellate strategy, counsel should honor a client's insistence on pursuing nonfrivolous claims. Anders and Faretta, he thought, reflect the constitutional importance of a defendant's control over at least some fundamental decisions.

Still, ethical best practices do not automatically define the constitutional minimum. Because counsel's performance fell within the range of professional competence and gave Barnes an adequate opportunity to present his claims in the state appellate process, Justice Blackmun concluded that no constitutional violation occurred here.

Justice Blackmun also maintained that counsel's refusal to raise nonfrivolous constitutional claims expressly demanded by a client should constitute cause and prejudice for a resulting state procedural default. Thus, although the Court did not reach that habeas question, he believed counsel's refusal should not permanently prevent later review of such claims.

Dissents

Justice Brennan

Reasoning

Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, would have held that the constitutional right to the assistance of counsel on a first appeal includes the defendant's personal authority to direct counsel to raise nonfrivolous issues. In his view, counsel is an assistant and advocate for the accused, not a state-appointed decisionmaker entitled to override the client's considered choices.

He read Faretta and Anders as protecting not only competent advocacy but also the defendant's autonomy and dignity. Faretta recognizes a defendant's personal right to control the defense even when self-representation is unwise, while Anders requires counsel who believes an appeal lacks merit to identify arguable grounds so the client can raise points of the client's choosing. Those decisions, he argued, reject an all-or-nothing model in which accepting counsel means surrendering control over all but the most basic decisions.

Justice Brennan acknowledged that appellate lawyers should ordinarily focus on the best few arguments and that a prudent client will usually accept counsel's strategic advice. But the constitutional question, in his view, was not whether client-selected arguments are always strategically wise; it was whether a lawyer may refuse to present nonfrivolous claims after the client has been fully advised and still insists on them.

He also stressed the practical relationship between appointed lawyers and indigent defendants. Because indigent clients may understandably distrust attorneys assigned by the State, a rule allowing counsel to disregard their requests could deepen that mistrust and impair representation more broadly. He was less concerned than the majority that additional claims would prevent appellate judges from recognizing meritorious arguments.

Justice Brennan would not automatically rule for Barnes on the existing record. He would remand for a factual determination whether Barnes, after receiving counsel's advice, actually and timely insisted that counsel brief the nonfrivolous claims at issue. If Barnes did so, he would find a denial of the assistance of counsel; if Barnes accepted filing his own pro se materials instead, no constitutional deprivation would follow.