Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1982

United States v. Ross

456 U.S. 798 | 102 S. Ct. 2157 | 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 | 1982 U.S. LEXIS 18 | 50 U.S.L.W. 4580

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Takeaway

In short, Ross holds that probable cause to search a vehicle allows police to search every part of it, including closed containers, that could hide the object of the search—without first obtaining a warrant.

Background

A reliable informant told District of Columbia police that Albert Ross, known as “Bandit,” was selling narcotics kept in the trunk of a purplish-maroon Chevrolet Malibu parked near Ridge Street. The informant had just seen a sale, described Ross and the car, and said Ross had additional narcotics in the trunk. Police corroborated key details: they found the described Malibu, learned it was registered to Albert Ross, and confirmed that Ross fit the description and used the alias “Bandit.”

When officers later saw Ross driving the Malibu, they stopped it. A bullet in plain view on the front seat led officers to find a pistol in the glove compartment and arrest Ross. Officers then opened the trunk and found a closed brown paper bag containing heroin. At the police station, they searched the trunk further and opened a zippered red leather pouch containing $3,200. No warrant was obtained.

Ross was convicted of possessing heroin with intent to distribute. The Court of Appeals initially held that police could search the paper bag but not the leather pouch. Sitting en banc, the court held that police could seize but not open either closed container without a warrant. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify the permissible scope of a warrantless automobile search supported by probable cause.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether police who have probable cause to search an automobile for contraband may, without a warrant, open closed containers found within the vehicle that might conceal the object of the search.

Holding

Yes. When probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the warrantless search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search, including closed containers.

Reasoning

The automobile exception established in Carroll v. United States permits a warrantless vehicle search when officers have objective probable cause to believe the vehicle carries contraband. The exception reflects the practical difficulty of obtaining a warrant before a movable vehicle can leave the jurisdiction, while retaining the central requirement that probable cause—not an officer's unsupported good faith—must justify the intrusion.

The permissible scope of the search tracks the scope that a magistrate could authorize in a warrant. A warrant to search a car for a particular object would permit officers to inspect every area in which that object could reasonably be hidden, including the trunk, glove compartment, upholstery, and containers capable of holding it. Dispensing with prior judicial approval under the automobile exception does not narrow the places officers may search once probable cause to search the vehicle exists.

Carroll itself supported this conclusion because officers there opened parts of the car and tore into upholstery to find hidden liquor. The Court reasoned that it would be illogical to permit officers to search an automobile's concealed compartments but prohibit them from opening a bag or package found in those same areas. Earlier automobile-search cases also had sustained searches of packages and containers found during valid vehicle searches.

The rule turns on the object of the search and the places where there is probable cause to believe that object may be found, not on whether a particular container seems more or less deserving of privacy. Drawing constitutional lines between paper bags, suitcases, pouches, and other containers would be unprincipled and difficult to administer. A paper bag may conceal private effects no less than an expensive locked case.

The rule is limited by probable cause. Probable cause to find a stolen lawnmower in a garage does not authorize a search of an upstairs bedroom, and probable cause to find undocumented aliens in a van does not authorize opening a suitcase. Likewise, when police have probable cause directed only at a particular container, rather than the vehicle generally, that probable cause does not authorize a search of the entire vehicle.

Issue #2

Whether stare decisis required adherence to Robbins v. California and the broad language in Arkansas v. Sanders barring warrantless searches of closed containers found in automobiles.

Holding

No. The Court overruled Robbins and rejected the portion of Sanders inconsistent with the rule that probable cause to search an automobile permits a search of containers within it, while retaining Sanders's holding on its distinct facts.

Reasoning

Robbins involved probable cause to search an entire vehicle, yet its plurality treated all closed containers as independently protected from warrantless opening. The Court rejected that result because it conflicted with Carroll's understanding that a lawful automobile search extends to places and containers that may conceal the sought contraband. Robbins had no single majority rationale, and the argument adopted in Ross had not been fully presented there.

Sanders and United States v. Chadwick remained distinguishable because police in those cases had probable cause focused on a particular footlocker or suitcase before it was placed in a vehicle, rather than probable cause to search the vehicle generally. The Court therefore adhered to Sanders's holding but rejected its suggestion that a container's presence in an automobile is always irrelevant to the warrant analysis.

No legitimate reliance interest justified retaining the contrary rule. More importantly, the Court concluded that its new formulation better accorded with the historical rationale and practical operation of the automobile exception: a warrantless search based on probable cause is no broader and no narrower than the search a magistrate could authorize by warrant.

Concurrences

Justice Blackmun

Reasoning

Justice Blackmun noted that his prior dissents in automobile-container cases reflected continuing discomfort with the Court's shifting doctrine. He nevertheless joined the majority because a clear and authoritative rule was especially important to courts, police, and criminal defendants in this recurring area of Fourth Amendment law.

Justice Powell

Reasoning

Justice Powell had previously maintained that a person's reasonable expectation of privacy should be highly relevant to the validity of a warrantless search, even though expectations of privacy in automobiles are limited. He did not embrace the bright-line approach used by the Robbins plurality.

He joined the Court because the fractured opinions in Robbins showed the need for a clear, workable rule for police and courts. In his view, Ross offered necessary guidance and did not substantially depart from existing automobile-search doctrine under Carroll and Chambers.

Dissents

Justice White

Reasoning

Justice White would have retained Robbins v. California. Relying on Justice Stewart's reasoning in that case and much of Justice Marshall's analysis here, he would have affirmed the Court of Appeals' judgment that police could not open the closed containers without a warrant.

Justice Marshall

Reasoning

Justice Marshall argued that the majority effectively created a broad probable-cause exception to the warrant requirement. In his view, the Fourth Amendment requires that probable-cause judgments ordinarily be made by a neutral and detached magistrate, not by officers engaged in the competitive enterprise of investigating crime. Justice Brennan joined this dissent.

The traditional rationales for the automobile exception did not, in his view, support opening movable containers. A car may create practical difficulties because it is mobile and may be burdensome to secure, but a bag, suitcase, or pouch can readily be seized and held while police seek a warrant. Nor does a closed container share the automobile's diminished expectation of privacy.

Justice Marshall read Chadwick, Sanders, and Robbins as establishing that closed opaque containers ordinarily receive the same warrant protection inside an automobile as outside it. Because Ross had been arrested and the containers were securely in police custody, officers could seize them but should have obtained a warrant before inspecting their contents.

He also criticized the majority's distinction between probable cause directed at a vehicle and probable cause directed at a particular container. In his view, a container is not less private merely because officers discover it during a general vehicle search. The resulting rule perversely makes constitutional protection depend on whether officers know exactly where the contraband is located.

Justice Marshall warned that the decision would expose ordinary personal effects—such as paper bags, toolboxes, knapsacks, suitcases, and attaché cases—to warrantless searches whenever police claim probable cause to search a car. Greater efficiency in law enforcement, he concluded, cannot alone justify sacrificing the Fourth Amendment's warrant safeguard.