Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1982

Greene v. Lindsey

456 U.S. 444 | 102 S. Ct. 1874 | 72 L. Ed. 2d 249 | 1982 U.S. LEXIS 114

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that eviction notice by door posting alone violates due process when the State knows posted notices are frequently removed and can cheaply use a more reliable method, such as mailed notice, to supplement posting.

Background

Louisville’s public housing authority brought forcible-entry-and-detainer actions in 1975 to evict tenants Linnie Lindsey, Barbara Hodgens, and Pamela Ray. Under Kentucky law, a process server who could not find the tenant or an eligible family member at the premises could serve the summons by posting it conspicuously on the property. In each case, a writ was posted on the tenant’s apartment door.

The tenants said they never saw the posted writs and did not learn of the eviction actions until writs of possession were served after default judgments had been entered and the time for appeal had expired. They brought a class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Kentucky’s posting procedure denied them Fourteenth Amendment due process.

The District Court granted summary judgment for the sheriff and deputy sheriffs. Although it recognized undisputed evidence that notices on apartment doors were often removed by other tenants, it relied on an older Sixth Circuit decision approving posting under Kentucky’s predecessor statute. The Sixth Circuit reversed, overruled that precedent, and held that posting alone was not reasonably calculated to give notice where process servers knew that notices were frequently removed. The Supreme Court affirmed.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether Kentucky may treat a forcible entry and detainer action as an in rem proceeding and therefore rely on posted notice without further due-process scrutiny.

Holding

No. The in rem label does not itself establish that posting provides constitutionally adequate notice.

Reasoning

Due process requires notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to inform interested persons that a proceeding is pending and to allow them an opportunity to object. The Court therefore declined, as it had in Mullane, to make the constitutional question turn on the traditional classification of the action as in rem or in personam.

The nature of the action remains relevant because it indicates the interests at stake, but it is not dispositive. An eviction proceeding threatens a tenant’s significant property interest in continued possession of a home. The adequacy of notice must consequently be measured by its real-world capacity to inform the affected people, not by the formal proposition that notice is served upon the property.

Issue #2

Whether Kentucky’s practice of posting an eviction summons on a public-housing tenant’s apartment door, after one unsuccessful attempt at personal service, satisfies the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

Holding

No. As applied in these public housing projects, posting alone was not notice reasonably calculated to apprise tenants of the eviction proceedings.

Reasoning

Posting on the door of a residence can often be a sensible and effective substitute for personal service. A person ordinarily monitors his home, and a posted notice concerning possession of that home will often come to his attention. If the person has abandoned the residence, moreover, the practical harm from lack of actual notice is reduced.

The record showed a materially different reality in these housing projects. Process servers knew that children and other tenants not infrequently removed posted writs before the intended tenants saw them, and the tenants here alleged that this is precisely what happened. Under those conditions, posting on an apartment door was not a reliable method of informing tenants that their homes were at risk.

Kentucky’s procedure did not make posting a genuine last resort. After a single unsuccessful visit, the process server could immediately post the writ; neither the statute nor ordinary practice required a second attempt at a time when the tenant might be home. A missed first visit did not justify treating a tenant as though the tenant had abandoned an interest in the apartment.

Feasible and customary alternatives matter in judging notice. Mail was an inexpensive and efficient supplement, especially because the property at issue was also the tenant’s mailing address. The Court did not prescribe Kentucky’s exact replacement procedure, but held that continued exclusive reliance on a method known to be unreliable was unconstitutional when mail could readily improve the likelihood of actual notice.

Dissents

Justice O'Connor

Reasoning

Justice O'Connor dissented, arguing that kentucky’s forcible entry and detainer action is a summary procedure designed to resolve possession disputes quickly. In Justice O’Connor’s view, that purpose requires service methods that are prompt and dependable, and Kentucky’s sequence—personal service, then service on an adult family member, and finally conspicuous posting—reasonably accommodated that need.

Posting has long been accepted in similar proceedings, and at least 11 States permitted service by posting or leaving notice at a tenant’s residence. The majority itself acknowledged that posting on a residence will often be especially effective. Justice O’Connor therefore saw substantial historical and legislative support for Kentucky’s judgment.

The evidence that notices were removed was thin and conflicting. Some process servers reported seeing children take writs down, but others had never observed that problem or said they posted writs high enough to prevent it. Justice O’Connor maintained that this limited record did not justify invalidating Kentucky’s statute and effectively casting doubt on comparable laws in other States.

The majority assumed that mailed notice was constitutionally superior without evidence about the reliability, speed, theft, misdelivery, or delay of mail in public housing projects. Because mailboxes may also be vulnerable to theft and posting ensures that the notice reaches the tenant’s door, she concluded that the Court had improperly substituted its own policy preference for the Kentucky Legislature’s reasonable choice.