Takeaway
In short, this case holds that the State may not use an ambiguous presumption of intent if a reasonable juror could treat it as conclusive or as shifting to the defendant the burden to disprove an element of the crime.
David Sandstrom, age 18, confessed to killing Annie Jessen and was charged with deliberate homicide under Montana law, which required that he purposely or knowingly cause another person's death. At trial, Sandstrom conceded that he killed Jessen but argued that, because of a personality disorder aggravated by alcohol, he did not act purposely or knowingly. Two mental-health experts testified about his mental condition.
Over defense counsel's due-process objection, the trial judge instructed the jury: "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." The jury convicted Sandstrom of deliberate homicide, and he received a 100-year sentence. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the instruction imposed only a burden of producing some contrary evidence, rather than a burden of disproving intent. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
Issue #1
Whether instructing the jury that "the law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts" violates due process when intent is an element of the charged offense.
Holding
Yes. The instruction was unconstitutional because a reasonable juror could have understood it either as conclusively establishing intent or as shifting to Sandstrom the burden of persuading the jury that he lacked intent.
Reasoning
The constitutional effect of a jury instruction turns on how a reasonable juror could understand the actual words used. This instruction did not say that jurors were permitted to infer intent, or that they could reject the inference. By saying that "the law presumes" intent, it could readily have been understood as mandatory rather than permissive.
The instruction also failed to tell the jury that the presumption was rebuttable, much less that it could be rebutted merely by producing some contrary evidence. A reasonable juror therefore could have treated the presumption as conclusive: once the jury found that Sandstrom voluntarily acted and that death was an ordinary consequence, it might have believed that it was required to find intent.
Alternatively, jurors could have understood the instruction to require them to find intent unless Sandstrom proved the contrary by an unspecified quantum of evidence. That understanding would shift the burden of persuasion on intent to the defendant. Montana's own evidence rule, which provided that a disputable presumption could be overcome by a preponderance of contrary evidence, reinforced the plausibility of that interpretation.
Under In re Winship, due process requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime. Under Montana law, acting purposely or knowingly was an element of deliberate homicide and was the central disputed issue at Sandstrom's trial.
A conclusive presumption would remove the element of intent from the jury's independent determination, contrary to Morissette and United States Gypsum. A persuasion-shifting presumption would likewise violate due process under Mullaney because it would require the defendant to disprove an element that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court's general instructions on the presumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof did not cure the defect. Jurors could have regarded the challenged presumption as the mechanism by which the State had established intent beyond a reasonable doubt.
Issue #2
Whether the conviction could stand on the theory that the jury may have found Sandstrom acted knowingly without relying on the instruction concerning intent or purpose.
Holding
No. Because the jury returned a general verdict, the Court could not determine that it rested solely on a valid knowledge theory rather than on the unconstitutional presumption.
Reasoning
Montana argued that the word "intends" might have referred only to purposeful conduct, while the jury could have convicted Sandstrom on the separate ground that he acted knowingly. The Court found it doubtful that jurors would draw such a narrow distinction, because criminal intent commonly encompasses both purpose and knowledge.
More importantly, even if the jury could have convicted on a knowledge theory without using the presumption, there was no way to know that it actually did so. When a general verdict may rest on either a constitutional or an unconstitutional theory, the conviction cannot stand because the reviewing court cannot assume the jury selected the valid ground.
Issue #3
Whether the Supreme Court should decide in the first instance whether the unconstitutional instruction was harmless error.
Holding
No. The Court left any harmless-error question for the Montana courts to consider on remand.
Reasoning
Montana contended that the error was harmless because Sandstrom's confession and psychiatric evidence supposedly showed the required mental state. Sandstrom responded that he admitted only the killing, not the requisite purpose or knowledge, and that the psychiatric evidence supported his defense.
The Montana Supreme Court had not considered harmless error or the related factual arguments. Rather than resolve those matters initially, the Court reversed and remanded, leaving the state court free to address them if appropriate.