Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1977

National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie

432 U.S. 43 | 97 S. Ct. 2205 | 53 L. Ed. 2d 96 | 1977 U.S. LEXIS 113

Full access

Unlock the video and quiz

The written brief is free to read below. Subscribe to watch the video explainer and take the quiz.

Create an account Log in

Takeaway

In short, this case holds that a State enforcing a prior restraint on speech must provide prompt appellate review or stay the restraint while appeal is pending; otherwise, the delay itself may inflict an unconstitutional loss of First Amendment freedom.

Background

The Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois, enjoined the National Socialist Party of America and related petitioners from marching, walking, or parading in party uniform; displaying a swastika; and distributing or displaying material that incited or promoted hatred against Jews or persons identified by faith, ancestry, race, or religion within Skokie.

The Illinois Appellate Court denied a stay pending appeal. Petitioners then asked the Illinois Supreme Court both to stay the injunction and to allow a direct, expedited appeal. That court denied both requests. Petitioners sought relief from Justice Stevens as Circuit Justice, who referred the application to the full Supreme Court. The Court treated the application as a petition for certiorari from the Illinois Supreme Court's denial of a stay, granted review, and reversed.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the Illinois Supreme Court's refusal to stay the injunction pending appeal was a final judgment subject to Supreme Court review under 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

Holding

Yes. The denial of a stay was a reviewable final judgment because it conclusively resolved a collateral claim that petitioners would lose First Amendment rights during the appellate process.

Reasoning

Although the underlying validity of the injunction had not yet been decided on appeal, the stay ruling resolved a distinct and urgent question: whether petitioners could exercise the restrained expressive rights while their appeal proceeded. That question was separable from the merits of the injunction itself.

The Court applied the collateral-order principle, reasoning that the refusal to stay finally determined petitioners' claim that the injunction would deprive them of First Amendment freedoms during a potentially lengthy appellate process. Because ordinary appellate review could take a year or more, later review of the injunction's merits would not remedy the loss of speech during that period.

Issue #2

Whether a State may leave a broad restraint on expressive activity in effect during ordinary appellate review without either providing immediate appellate review or granting a stay.

Holding

No. When a State imposes this kind of prior restraint, it must furnish strict procedural safeguards, including immediate appellate review; absent such review, it must allow a stay pending appeal.

Reasoning

The injunction directly prohibited expressive conduct and materials, including parading in party uniforms, displaying swastikas, and distributing specified literature. A restraint of that character implicates First Amendment interests and therefore triggers the strict procedural safeguards required for prior restraints.

Drawing on Freedman v. Maryland and Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, the Court held that prompt appellate review is necessary to prevent protected expression from being suppressed merely because litigation is slow. Illinois had denied both a stay and an expedited appeal, leaving petitioners subject to the injunction throughout ordinary appellate proceedings.

Because Illinois did not provide immediate appellate review, it was required to preserve petitioners' position by staying the injunction. The Illinois Supreme Court's refusal to do so denied petitioners the procedural protection required by the First Amendment, so the Supreme Court reversed and remanded.

Dissents

Justice White

Reasoning

Justice White stated that he would deny the stay. He did not provide a separate explanation for that conclusion.

Justice Rehnquist

Reasoning

Justice Rehnquist argued that the Court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. In his view, a state supreme court's discretionary refusal to stay a lower-court injunction pending appeal is not a final judgment or decree rendered by the highest state court in which a decision could be had.

He distinguished Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn because, in Cox, the state supreme court had finally decided the federal issue. Here, no Illinois appellate court had yet decided the merits of petitioners' First Amendment claim; the Illinois Supreme Court had only declined interim relief.

Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the Cook County injunction was extremely broad and expected Illinois appellate courts to modify it substantially under precedents such as Freedman and Nebraska Press. But he maintained that the Supreme Court should not disregard congressionally imposed limits on its jurisdiction, even to prevent an erroneous state trial-court injunction from burdening constitutional rights. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart joined this dissent.