Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida

The Court accepted that the action was essentially possessory in character, but held that the critical allegation—the Oneidas' present right to possession—was itself grounded in federal law. The complaint did not merely anticipate that the counties would raise a federal issue as a defense; it alleged that treaties, federal statutes, and federal protection of Indian title directly supplied the right the Oneidas sought to enforce.

Federal law has long recognized tribal occupancy rights in aboriginal lands. Although the sovereign held ultimate title, an Indian tribe retained a right of occupancy enforceable against everyone except the sovereign, and that right could be extinguished only by sovereign action. After the Constitution, the regulation and termination of tribal land rights became exclusively a matter of federal law.

The alleged federal sources of the Oneidas' claim were substantial. The treaties identified in the complaint confirmed the Oneidas' possession of their lands, and the Nonintercourse Act of 1790 prohibited sales of Indian land unless made under federal authority. Thus, if New York obtained the 1795 cession without the required federal consent, the Oneidas plausibly retained a federally protected possessory right.

This conclusion applied even though New York was one of the original States and held fee title or a preemptive right to purchase Indian lands within its borders. That historical feature did not give New York unilateral authority to terminate Indian occupancy. Federal treaties and statutes continued to protect tribal possession, and federal law controlled whether that possession had been lawfully extinguished.

The Court emphasized that jurisdiction did not depend on the Oneidas ultimately winning. Their claim could later fail for factual, legal, or equitable reasons. At the jurisdictional stage, however, the asserted federal right was not so implausible, insubstantial, or foreclosed that it failed to present a federal controversy.

The lower courts read Taylor v. Anderson to mean that a possessory action remains a state-law claim when federal law matters only because it may invalidate the defendant's title. The Supreme Court distinguished Taylor rather than overruling it. In Taylor, the plaintiffs' essential claim was an ordinary right to possession, while federal restrictions on alienation were relevant only to the validity of an opposing deed.

The Oneidas' claim was different because tribal land rights were not merely ordinary property interests derived from a federal conveyance and thereafter governed by local law. The complaint alleged that federal law had continuously protected the tribe's right of occupancy from the Nation's founding onward. The federal treaties and Nonintercourse Act therefore went to the source, nature, and continuing existence of the claimed possessory right itself.

The Court also distinguished cases involving federal patents or grants to private landowners. Once the federal government grants ordinary title, the ordinary incidents of ownership usually become questions of state property law. But the federal government retained a continuing protective role over tribal lands, particularly through the requirement of federal consent to alienation. That continuing federal responsibility made this dispute federally cognizable.

The Court recognized New York's long historical relationship with Indian tribes and Congress's later decision to grant New York courts jurisdiction over many civil disputes involving Indians. But the 1950 statute expressly preserved tribal laws and customs, protected reservation lands from taxation, and stated that it did not authorize the alienation of tribal reservation lands.

Most importantly, the statute withheld state-court jurisdiction and state-law applicability for civil actions involving Indian lands or land claims arising from transactions or events before September 13, 1952. The Oneidas' challenge to the 1795 transfer fell squarely within that protection. The statute therefore reinforced, rather than undermined, the conclusion that the federal courts could adjudicate the federal basis of the claim.

Because the Court found jurisdiction under the ordinary arising-under language shared by §§ 1331 and 1362, it did not decide the Oneidas' additional argument that § 1362 independently broadened federal-question jurisdiction for suits brought by Indian tribes.