Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1997

Mazurek v. Armstrong

520 U.S. 968 | 117 S. Ct. 1865 | 138 L. Ed. 2d 162 | 1997 U.S. LEXIS 3687

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Takeaway

In short, this case reaffirmed that a physician-only abortion rule is not an undue burden absent evidence that it actually creates a substantial obstacle or was enacted with a supported, unconstitutional purpose.

Background

In 1995, Montana enacted a law providing that only licensed physicians could perform abortions. The law prevented Susan Cahill, the State's only physician assistant then performing abortions, from continuing to perform first-trimester abortions under a supervising physician's approved utilization plan.

Cahill, her supervising physician, and other physicians challenged the law. The District Court denied a preliminary injunction because the challengers had not produced sufficient evidence that the physician-only rule created a substantial obstacle to women seeking abortions under Planned Parenthood v. Casey. The Ninth Circuit vacated that ruling, holding that the challengers had shown a fair chance of success because the Legislature may have enacted the law with an improper purpose of making abortions harder to obtain. It remanded for consideration of the balance of hardships.

While the case was pending, the District Court entered a limited injunction pending appeal that allowed Cahill alone to continue performing abortions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, reversed the Ninth Circuit, and remanded.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the challengers showed a sufficient likelihood of success to support preliminary injunctive relief against Montana's physician-only abortion law.

Holding

No. The Ninth Circuit erred in concluding that the challengers had a fair chance of establishing that the law imposed an undue burden on access to abortion.

Reasoning

Casey defines an undue burden as a regulation that has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion. The District Court found insufficient evidence that requiring a licensed physician to perform abortions would, in practical terms, create such an obstacle. The Ninth Circuit did not dispute that factual conclusion.

The Ninth Circuit instead relied on the possibility that the Legislature acted with an improper purpose. But the Supreme Court found no evidence supporting the inference that Montana enacted the physician-only rule to create a substantial obstacle to abortion. Courts do not presume unconstitutional legislative intent even when a statute causes harmful effects; they certainly should not presume it where the record showed no substantial obstructive effect.

The evidence cited by the challengers did not establish an unlawful purpose. That medical studies may show physician assistants to be as safe as physicians does not invalidate the law, because Casey recognized that States have broad latitude to reserve particular functions for licensed professionals even when others could competently perform them. The fact that an antiabortion group drafted the law likewise did not prove the Legislature's purpose in enacting it.

Although Cahill was the only nonphysician affected by the statute, that fact did not show a purpose to obstruct abortion access. Under the prior arrangement, Cahill could perform abortions only with a licensed physician present, and the new rule therefore did not require women to seek care at a different facility. The narrow practical effect supported the District Court's conclusion that no substantial obstacle had been shown.

The Court's earlier decisions also consistently recognized a State's authority to limit the performance of abortions to physicians. Roe v. Wade stated that a State may proscribe abortions performed by persons who are not physicians; Connecticut v. Menillo held that prosecuting nonphysicians for performing abortions does not invade constitutionally protected privacy; and Casey upheld a physician-only requirement even for the less significant task of providing information to patients.

Issue #2

Whether the Supreme Court should review and summarily reverse the Ninth Circuit's interlocutory decision before final judgment in the lower courts.

Holding

Yes. Although review of nonfinal judgments is unusual, summary reversal was warranted here.

Reasoning

The Court ordinarily hesitates to grant certiorari before final judgment, but its jurisdiction is not limited to final decisions. Here, the Ninth Circuit's determination that the challengers had a fair chance of success was plainly inconsistent with governing abortion precedents.

The Ninth Circuit's ruling had immediate consequences: it led to an injunction preventing Montana from enforcing its law against Cahill while the preliminary-injunction proceedings continued. The ruling also threatened to encourage similar preliminary challenges to physician-only laws in other Ninth Circuit States based merely on allegations of improper legislative purpose without supporting evidence.

Dissents

Justice Stevens

Reasoning

Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, did not maintain that the physician-only provision was necessarily unconstitutional. Instead, he concluded that the Court should deny certiorari because the case was at an early preliminary-injunction stage and the lower courts had not yet made a final determination on the constitutional claim.

In his view, the record contained meaningful evidence that the 1995 legislation may have been designed to target Cahill personally. She was the only physician assistant performing abortions in Montana; legislative hearings repeatedly referred to her by name; and the law's other provisions revived restrictions that prior litigation had already held unconstitutional. Those circumstances, he reasoned, could support an inquiry into whether the Legislature's predominant purpose was to make abortions more difficult to obtain.

Justice Stevens also thought the Ninth Circuit had merely required further factual examination of legislative purpose, rather than invalidated physician-only laws generally. The limited injunction applied only to Cahill, and he saw no realistic threat to the many other state physician-only regimes cited by the Court. Because further proceedings could clarify both the facts and the legal issues, he believed summary Supreme Court intervention was premature.

Finally, Justice Stevens stated that, if the Court chose to review the case, it should address whether the Ninth Circuit had properly relied on Miller v. Johnson and Shaw v. Hunt in considering legislative motive. The majority declined to reach that question after finding the record insufficient to show an obstructive legislative purpose.