Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1972

Morrissey v. Brewer

408 U.S. 471 | 92 S. Ct. 2593 | 33 L. Ed. 2d 484 | 1972 U.S. LEXIS 19

Full access

Unlock the video and quiz

The written brief is free to read below. Subscribe to watch the video explainer and take the quiz.

Create an account Log in

Takeaway

In short, this case holds that parole is protected conditional liberty: before revoking it, a State must provide a prompt preliminary probable-cause hearing and a reasonably timely final hearing with basic procedural safeguards.

Background

Morrissey and Booher were Iowa parolees who were arrested at their parole officers’ direction for alleged violations of their parole conditions. Each was held in a local jail, and the Iowa Board of Parole revoked each parole on the basis of the supervising officer’s written report. Both men were returned to the state penitentiary, allegedly without a hearing before revocation.

After exhausting state remedies, the parolees sought federal habeas relief, claiming that revocation without a hearing violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The District Court rejected the claims under then-controlling authority. Sitting en banc, the Eighth Circuit affirmed by a 4-to-3 vote. It reasoned that parole remained a form of custody, that revocation was largely discretionary and administrative, and that requiring adversary procedures would improperly burden parole administration.

Before the Supreme Court, Iowa asserted for the first time that each petitioner had received a later hearing before the Board and had admitted the alleged violations. Because those assertions were not established in the record below, the Court treated the case as presenting the claim that the paroles had been revoked without a hearing.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause applies when a State revokes an individual’s parole.

Holding

Yes. A parolee’s conditional liberty is an interest protected by the Due Process Clause, and the State may not terminate it without an orderly, though informal, procedure.

Reasoning

Parole is not simply an act of grace or a revocable “privilege.” It is an established part of the correctional system that permits a person to live and work in the community, maintain family and social relationships, and avoid confinement, subject to specified conditions. The Court rejected the right-versus-privilege distinction as the measure of constitutional protection.

Although a parolee’s liberty is conditional and more restricted than the liberty of an ordinary citizen, its loss is a grievous one. Revocation may return the parolee to prison for a substantial period, often without credit for time spent on parole. The parolee also has a legitimate expectation that conditional freedom will continue so long as parole conditions are substantially observed.

The State has a powerful interest in returning a parolee to prison without conducting a new criminal trial when the parolee has violated valid conditions of release. But that interest does not justify revocation based on unverified or erroneous information. Society also benefits when revocation decisions rest on accurate facts and are made with basic fairness, which can support rehabilitation rather than undermine it.

Issue #2

Whether due process requires a preliminary hearing after a parolee is arrested for an alleged violation.

Holding

Yes. Due process requires a prompt, local preliminary inquiry by an uninvolved decisionmaker to determine whether there is probable cause, or reasonable ground, to believe that the parolee violated parole conditions.

Reasoning

A parolee is commonly arrested far from the prison to which he may be returned, and a substantial delay may occur before the final revocation decision. A prompt preliminary hearing near the place of arrest helps preserve fresh evidence and available witnesses while protecting against unjustified detention and transfer to prison.

The preliminary probable-cause determination must be made by a person not directly involved in reporting the alleged violation or recommending revocation. The Court did not assume that a supervising parole officer acts with hostility, but concluded that an officer who initiated the case cannot always evaluate that recommendation with complete objectivity.

At the preliminary hearing, the parolee must receive notice of the hearing and of the claimed violations; may appear, speak, and present relevant letters, documents, or witnesses; and may question adverse sources on request. Confrontation may be withheld when disclosure would expose an informant to a risk of harm. The hearing officer must summarize the proceedings and state the evidence and reasons supporting a probable-cause finding, though formal findings of fact are unnecessary.

Issue #3

What procedures due process requires before the final revocation of parole.

Holding

Due process requires a final revocation hearing within a reasonable time, with specified minimum safeguards, before the parole authority makes its final decision.

Reasoning

The final hearing serves a different function from the preliminary inquiry. It must resolve contested relevant facts and permit an informed discretionary judgment about whether the proven violation warrants recommitment, rather than some lesser response. The parolee must be able both to deny the violation and to offer mitigating circumstances.

The minimum safeguards are written notice of the claimed violations; disclosure of the evidence against the parolee; an opportunity to appear personally and present witnesses and documentary evidence; and an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause to deny confrontation.

The decision must be made by a neutral and detached hearing body, such as a parole board, whose members need not be judges or lawyers. The factfinders must provide a written statement identifying the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revocation. A hearing held within two months after custody would not, on the Court’s understanding, appear unreasonable.

The Court stressed that parole revocation is not part of a criminal prosecution. Thus, the full range of criminal-trial protections does not apply. The proceeding may remain flexible and may consider materials, such as letters and affidavits, that would not necessarily be admissible at a criminal trial. The Court expressly declined to decide whether a parolee has a right to retained or appointed counsel.

Issue #4

Whether the petitioners were entitled to immediate habeas relief on the record before the Court.

Holding

No definitive relief was ordered on the existing record; the Court reversed and remanded for factual findings on the procedures actually used in these revocations.

Reasoning

Iowa’s claim that the petitioners later received Board hearings and admitted the violations was raised only in its Supreme Court briefing and rested on recollections rather than a record developed below. The Court would not resolve the case on those untested factual assertions.

On remand, the District Court was directed to determine whether the petitioners admitted violations before a neutral officer, whether those admissions supplied adequate grounds for revocation under state standards, or whether the procedures actually used satisfied the due-process standards announced by the Court. Any of those findings could resolve the individual due-process claims.

Concurrences

Justice Brennan

Reasoning

Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, agreed that due process requires both a preliminary probable-cause hearing and a final revocation hearing, each with notice, an impartial decisionmaker, an opportunity to present evidence, limited confrontation rights, a record, and written reasons. He therefore agreed that remand was appropriate.

He disagreed with the majority’s decision to reserve the counsel question entirely. In his view, Goldberg v. Kelly already established that a parolee must at least be permitted to retain counsel at a revocation hearing. Counsel can identify disputed issues, organize factual contentions, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and otherwise protect the parolee’s interests. The only unresolved question, he maintained, was whether counsel must be appointed for an indigent parolee.

Dissents

Justice Douglas

Reasoning

Justice Douglas agreed that Iowa’s summary revocation practice violated due process, but he regarded the Court’s protections as insufficient. In his view, parole is a significant form of liberty central to modern rehabilitation, and vague or technical parole conditions give officers broad power that demands stronger procedural restraints.

He would ordinarily require notice and a hearing before arresting and incarcerating a parolee for a claimed condition violation. Where the asserted violation is not serious, he saw no reason to imprison the parolee before a hearing; a willful failure to appear could itself justify arrest. He distinguished situations in which the parolee is arrested for a new criminal offense, which are governed by ordinary criminal procedures.

Justice Douglas would also require a hearing before an officer other than the supervising parole officer, who functions in part like an accuser or prosecutor. The parolee should receive notice, be allowed to confront accusers, present evidence and argument, and retain conditional freedom until the hearing has occurred and the authorized parole body has acted.

He further would recognize a right to counsel. Because the consequences of revocation are severe and the factual allegations may be vague, trivial, mistaken, or susceptible to explanation, counsel is needed to ensure that relevant facts are developed, insubstantial claims are challenged, and the proceeding is genuinely fair.