Dunn v. Blumstein

Although Blumstein eventually became eligible to vote, the statutory restrictions remained on the books and continued to affect the class of newly arrived residents he represented. The short duration of election cycles made this type of exclusion likely to end before ordinary litigation could be completed.

Unlike a case in which the State had repealed or materially changed the challenged rule, Tennessee's one-year and three-month requirements continued to govern voting eligibility. Blumstein therefore retained a sufficient personal and class-based stake to challenge the existing law.

The requirements created two classes of bona fide residents—longtime residents who could vote and recent residents who could not. Because the classification completely denied some otherwise qualified citizens the opportunity to vote, it burdened a fundamental political right and required close constitutional scrutiny.

The requirements also singled out persons who had recently moved across state lines and imposed a penalty on their exercise of the constitutional right to travel. A State may not force a person to choose between moving to a new home and participating in the political process there unless the burden is necessary to serve a compelling governmental interest.

The Court rejected Tennessee's reliance on older precedent applying a more deferential standard. Modern voting-rights cases, especially Kramer v. Union Free School District, required the State to establish that exclusions from the franchise are necessary, not merely reasonable or convenient.

Strict scrutiny required more than proof that Tennessee's goals were important. The State also had to show that its chosen waiting periods were precisely tailored and that less burdensome, reasonable alternatives would not adequately achieve the same ends.

Tennessee had a legitimate and compelling interest in preventing nonresidents from voting fraudulently, including through dual voting or organized colonization. But the State's actual objective was to distinguish bona fide residents from nonresidents, and the waiting periods excluded many undisputedly bona fide new residents along with any potential fraudsters.

Tennessee's voter-registration system already required applicants to swear to their qualifications, including residence, and it allowed registration until 30 days before an election. A dishonest nonresident willing to commit fraud could falsely swear to a year or three months of residence as readily as to current residence; the durational rule therefore primarily burdened truthful new residents rather than deterring determined fraudsters.

The State could verify bona fide residence through individualized evidence, such as a person's dwelling, employment, driver's license, car registration, and other objective indicia. Election officials could also cross-check new registrants against records from their former jurisdictions to guard against dual voting.

Tennessee's own 30-day registration cutoff indicated that a much shorter period was adequate for ordinary administrative preparation and investigation. The Court also noted the availability of criminal laws against fraudulent registration and voting, as well as election-day voter challenges, as less restrictive tools for protecting election integrity.

The Court rejected the idea that a waiting period could operate as a conclusive presumption that new arrivals were not genuine residents. Under Carrington v. Rash, administrative convenience cannot justify a blanket denial of the franchise when more individualized and accurate means are available to identify qualified residents.

A State may generally limit its electorate to bona fide residents of the relevant political community. But that permissible residence requirement did not justify a separate rule excluding persons whose actual residence was conceded solely because they had arrived recently.

Tennessee's desire for voters with a shared local outlook was constitutionally impermissible. New residents have an equal right to political representation, and a State may not fence them out because it fears that they may retain different views, have a more national perspective, or vote differently from established residents.

The claim that longtime residents vote more intelligently also failed because the classification was grossly imprecise. It allowed uninformed longtime residents to vote while excluding new residents who may be highly informed, particularly those motivated enough to register and vote soon after moving.

Modern communications and the concentration of campaigning near an election undermined any assertion that a person must live in a State for a year or a county for three months to understand electoral issues. Tennessee produced no evidence supporting that broad presumption.

Tennessee's absentee-voting rules further weakened its asserted interest in an informed electorate. The State allowed longtime residents who were absent from local political debate to vote, showing that it did not apply its claimed knowledge-based criterion consistently or universally.