Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1972

Giglio v. United States

405 U.S. 150 | 92 S. Ct. 763 | 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 | 1972 U.S. LEXIS 83

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Takeaway

In short, Giglio holds that the prosecution must disclose material promises of leniency to key witnesses, and the Government remains responsible even when one prosecutor knows of the promise and another does not.

Background

John Giglio was convicted of passing forged money orders and sentenced to five years in prison. The Government’s case rested almost entirely on Robert Taliento, a bank teller and alleged coconspirator. Taliento testified that Giglio had obtained a customer signature card from him and used it to forge $2,300 in money orders, which Taliento then processed through the bank.

At trial, defense counsel tried to show that Taliento had reason to favor the Government because he expected leniency. Taliento denied that anyone had told him he would not be prosecuted, and the trial prosecutor told the jury that Taliento had received no promise that he would not be indicted.

While Giglio’s appeal was pending, defense counsel discovered evidence that an Assistant United States Attorney, DiPaola, had promised Taliento that he would not be prosecuted if he testified before the grand jury and at trial. The prosecutor who tried the case claimed he had been told that no immunity promise existed. The District Court denied a new trial, reasoning that any promise was unauthorized and would not have affected the verdict. The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the nondisclosed promise required a new trial under Napue and Brady.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether due process requires disclosure of a promise of nonprosecution made to the Government’s key witness when that promise bears on the witness’s credibility.

Holding

Yes. Due process requires a new trial when the Government suppresses material impeachment evidence, including a promise of leniency to a key witness.

Reasoning

The Court treated the undisclosed promise as evidence bearing directly on Taliento’s credibility. Under Napue, when a witness’s reliability may determine guilt or innocence, evidence affecting that witness’s credibility falls within the prosecution’s duty of disclosure. A promise not to prosecute gave Taliento a powerful reason to testify favorably for the Government, and the jury was entitled to evaluate his testimony with that information.

The Constitution forbids not only the knowing presentation of false evidence but also the Government’s failure to correct testimony it knows to be false. Taliento denied receiving a promise, and the prosecutor reinforced that denial in summation by stating that Taliento had received no promise of nonindictment. The undisclosed evidence therefore implicated the due-process principles recognized in Mooney, Napue, and Brady.

Brady does not require a new trial whenever later-discovered information might have been useful to the defense. The evidence must be material. Under Napue’s standard, a new trial is required when the false testimony could, in any reasonable likelihood, have affected the jury’s judgment. That standard was met because Taliento was the only witness linking Giglio to the crime; without his testimony, the Government had neither a basis for indictment nor sufficient evidence to send the case to the jury.

Issue #2

Whether the Government may avoid responsibility because the trial prosecutor did not know that another Assistant United States Attorney had promised the witness nonprosecution, or because that promise may have been unauthorized.

Holding

No. A promise made by one prosecutor is attributable to the Government, regardless of the trial prosecutor’s personal knowledge or the promise’s asserted lack of authorization.

Reasoning

The Court viewed the prosecutor’s office as a single governmental entity and its lawyers as spokesmen for the Government. Thus, DiPaola’s promise to Taliento was attributable to the United States even though another Assistant United States Attorney tried the case and claimed he had been told that no promise existed.

Whether the nondisclosure resulted from negligence or deliberate conduct did not alter the constitutional result. Brady makes the prosecution responsible for suppressing material evidence irrespective of good faith or bad faith. The Government cannot defeat a defendant’s due-process claim by relying on a failure of communication within its own office.

The Court acknowledged that this rule burdens large prosecutorial offices, but held that the burden can be met through procedures ensuring that relevant information is communicated to every lawyer handling a case. Internal office arrangements cannot justify withholding material information from the defense and jury.