Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1971

Griggs v. Duke Power Co.

401 U.S. 424 | 91 S. Ct. 849 | 28 L. Ed. 2d 158 | 1971 U.S. LEXIS 134

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Takeaway

In short, Griggs established disparate-impact liability under Title VII: a facially neutral employment practice that disproportionately excludes a protected group is unlawful unless the employer proves it is job related and necessary to the business.

Background

Before Title VII took effect, Duke Power openly segregated its Dan River, North Carolina plant by race. Black employees were confined to the lower-paid Labor Department, while white employees held jobs in the four operating departments. Promotions ordinarily occurred within departments, so this assignment system also restricted Black employees’ advancement.

Beginning in 1955, Duke required a high-school diploma for entry into most departments and for certain transfers. When Title VII became effective in 1965, the company added two standardized aptitude tests as a condition for placement in all but the Labor Department. The tests measured general intelligence and mechanical comprehension, not the skills needed for particular jobs. The requirements excluded Black applicants at a much higher rate than white applicants, while white employees without diplomas or test scores continued to perform satisfactorily in the jobs at issue.

The District Court found Duke’s pre-Act racial discrimination but treated Title VII as purely prospective and denied broader relief. The Court of Appeals held that Title VII did not prohibit the diploma and test requirements because Duke had adopted and applied them without discriminatory intent. It nevertheless ordered limited relief for certain incumbent Black workers affected by the prior segregated system. The Supreme Court granted review of the ruling upholding the diploma and testing requirements.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether Title VII prohibits facially neutral employment requirements that disproportionately exclude Black workers, even absent proof that the employer adopted them with discriminatory intent.

Holding

Yes. Title VII reaches employment practices that are neutral in form and intent but operate to exclude minority workers disproportionately, unless the employer shows that the requirements are related to job performance and justified by business necessity.

Reasoning

Title VII’s objective is to achieve equal employment opportunity and to remove barriers that historically favored white employees. A neutral rule cannot be retained when it freezes the effects of a prior discriminatory employment system. The statute therefore addresses discriminatory consequences, not merely deliberate racial classification.

Duke’s high-school and testing requirements operated as “built-in headwinds” for Black workers. Because Black workers in North Carolina had disproportionately received inferior education under segregation, they were far less likely than white workers to satisfy the diploma and test requirements. Equal formal application to white and Black applicants did not eliminate that unequal practical effect.

The Court rejected the idea that Title VII guarantees jobs regardless of qualifications. Employers may use legitimate qualifications, but they may not impose artificial, arbitrary, or unnecessary barriers that disproportionately exclude protected groups. The governing inquiry is business necessity: an exclusionary requirement must bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the job in question.

Duke did not show that either a high-school diploma or the general intelligence tests predicted successful performance in the relevant jobs. The company adopted the requirements based on a general desire to improve workforce quality, without a meaningful study connecting them to job duties. Moreover, employees who lacked diplomas and had not taken the tests had performed satisfactorily and advanced in the operating departments.

Issue #2

Whether § 703(h) of Title VII permits Duke to rely on professionally developed general-ability tests despite their racially exclusionary effect and lack of demonstrated job relevance.

Holding

No. Section 703(h) permits professionally developed ability tests only when they are not used to discriminate and when they measure abilities relevant to the job or class of jobs at issue.

Reasoning

Duke argued that § 703(h) authorized its tests because they were professionally prepared and were not adopted with a purpose to discriminate. The Court rejected that reading because it would allow a test to control employment opportunities even if it screened out Black workers disproportionately and did not measure their capacity to perform the work.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission interpreted § 703(h) to allow only tests that fairly measure the knowledge, skills, or abilities needed for the particular job or job category. The Court gave substantial deference to that interpretation because the EEOC administered and enforced Title VII, and its position fit both the statutory language and the Act’s central purpose.

The legislative history confirmed that Congress sought to preserve employers’ ability to use genuine job qualifications, not to authorize broad intelligence testing detached from actual work requirements. Congress did not forbid testing as such; it required that tests measure the person for the job rather than evaluate the person in the abstract. Duke’s general tests failed that standard.