Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1971

Harris v. New York

401 U.S. 222 | 91 S. Ct. 643 | 28 L. Ed. 2d 1 | 1971 U.S. LEXIS 75

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Takeaway

In short, Harris holds that a voluntary but Miranda-defective statement cannot prove the prosecution's case in chief, yet it may be used to impeach a testifying defendant's inconsistent trial testimony.

Background

New York charged Harris with two sales of heroin to an undercover officer. At trial, the officer described both sales, and other prosecution witnesses corroborated collateral details and the chemical identification of the substance. Harris testified in his own defense. He denied any sale on January 4 and admitted giving the officer a glassine bag on January 6, but claimed it contained baking powder and was part of a scheme to defraud the officer.

On cross-examination, the prosecutor confronted Harris with portions of a statement he gave police after his arrest that contradicted his trial account. The statement could not be used in the State's case in chief under Miranda because Harris had not been warned of his right to appointed counsel. Harris did not contend, however, that the statement was coerced or involuntary. The trial judge instructed the jury that the prior statement could be considered only in evaluating Harris's credibility, not as substantive evidence of guilt. The jury convicted him on the second count.

The New York Court of Appeals affirmed per curiam. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether a statement excluded from the prosecution's case in chief under Miranda may nevertheless be used to impeach a defendant who testifies inconsistently at trial.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the prosecution may use a voluntary statement obtained in violation of Miranda to impeach a defendant's credibility after the defendant testifies inconsistently at trial.

Holding

Yes. A statement inadmissible under Miranda in the prosecution's case in chief may be used to impeach the defendant's credibility, so long as the statement satisfies applicable standards of trustworthiness and voluntariness.

Reasoning

Miranda prevents the prosecution from establishing its affirmative case with custodial statements obtained without the required warnings and effective waiver. But the Court concluded that exclusion from the case in chief does not automatically mean the evidence is unavailable for every purpose. Harris did not claim his statement was coerced or involuntary, and its reliability was therefore not challenged on that ground.

The Court relied on the principle of Walder v. United States, which allowed illegally obtained evidence to rebut a defendant's untruthful testimony. Although Walder involved impeachment on a collateral matter and Harris's prior statement concerned the charged transactions themselves, the Court found no difference of constitutional principle sufficient to require a different result.

The prior statement gave the jury useful information for judging the credibility of Harris's account of the alleged sales. In the Court's view, the Miranda exclusionary rule should not become a device by which a defendant may testify falsely without exposure to contradiction through prior inconsistent statements.

The Court also reasoned that any additional deterrence gained by excluding the statement even for impeachment was too speculative to outweigh the truth-seeking function of cross-examination. Excluding the statement from the prosecution's case in chief supplied sufficient deterrence, while a defendant who voluntarily takes the stand remains obligated to testify truthfully.

Dissents

Justice Black

Reasoning

Justice Black dissented without a separate written opinion, so the Court's reports do not state an independent rationale for his disagreement.

Justice Brennan

Reasoning

Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Douglas and Marshall, argued that the statement was constitutionally inadmissible not only in the State's case in chief but also for impeachment. In his view, Miranda's protection against compelled self-incrimination applies when a statement is used to discredit the defendant just as much as when it is offered directly to prove guilt.

He read Walder narrowly. Walder permitted the government to rebut a defendant's broad, collateral assertion that he had never possessed narcotics, using evidence from a separate and earlier incident. Here, by contrast, the State used Harris's unwarned statement to impeach his denial of the very transactions charged in the indictment. Walder itself, Brennan stressed, recognized that a defendant must remain free to deny the elements of the charged offense without opening the door to illegally obtained evidence.

Justice Brennan maintained that allowing such impeachment burdens the defendant's Fifth Amendment choice whether to testify. Under Griffin v. California, the privilege is impaired when exercising it becomes costly; the threat that an unwarned statement will be used to undermine the defendant's testimony makes the decision to take the stand less than unfettered.

He also rejected the majority's deterrence analysis. Permitting impeachment use, he warned, gives police an incentive to obtain statements without complying with Miranda because the statements may still be valuable if the accused testifies. Beyond deterrence, he emphasized the privilege against self-incrimination as a protection of individual dignity and the integrity of an adversary system in which the government itself must obey constitutional limits.