Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1968

Green v. County School Board of New Kent County

391 U.S. 430 | 88 S. Ct. 1689 | 20 L. Ed. 2d 716 | 1968 U.S. LEXIS 1551

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Takeaway

In short, this case made clear that school boards must actually dismantle segregated dual systems: a formally neutral freedom-of-choice plan fails when it leaves racially identifiable schools intact.

Background

New Kent County, Virginia, operated a school system of about 1,300 students through two combined elementary and high schools. One, New Kent, was the white school; the other, George W. Watkins, was the Negro school. Although Black and white residents lived throughout the rural county and bus routes overlapped, every feature of the system—students, faculty, staff, transportation, activities, and facilities—reflected the State’s formerly mandatory racial segregation.

After Brown v. Board of Education, the Board continued operating the dual system for roughly a decade. In 1965, after this suit was filed and to preserve federal financial assistance, the Board adopted a freedom-of-choice plan. Students generally could choose either school each year, but students who made no choice were assigned to the school they had previously attended. First- and eighth-grade students had to make an affirmative choice. The plan also included a later amendment addressing nondiscriminatory faculty and staff employment and assignment.

The District Court approved the plan and denied injunctive relief. Sitting en banc, the Fourth Circuit affirmed approval of the student-assignment portion of the plan but remanded for a more specific faculty-desegregation order. The Supreme Court granted review. After three years under the plan, no white student had selected Watkins, and about 85 percent of Black students still attended Watkins.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether New Kent County’s freedom-of-choice student-assignment plan adequately discharged its duty under Brown II to dismantle its state-imposed dual school system.

Holding

No. The plan was constitutionally insufficient because it had not promptly and effectively converted the dual system into a unitary, nonracial system.

Reasoning

Brown I invalidated the state-created system of separate white and Negro schools, and Brown II required school officials to eliminate that system. The constitutional objective was not merely to permit individual Black students to enter formerly white schools. It was to dismantle the entire dual structure and establish a unitary school system in which schools were no longer racially identified.

A school board that formerly operated a state-compelled dual system bears an affirmative duty to remove segregation “root and branch.” That duty extends beyond formal admissions rules to the full operation of the school system, including student bodies, faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities.

The Board waited about a decade after Brown II before adopting its plan. In 1968, neither delay nor a plan lacking meaningful assurance of prompt desegregation could be tolerated. The time for Brown II’s transitional language of “all deliberate speed” had passed; the Board had to offer a plan that realistically promised to work now.

The actual results showed that the freedom-of-choice plan preserved rather than dismantled the old arrangement. No white child chose the formerly Black Watkins school, while 85 percent of Black children remained there. The system therefore still functioned as one white school and one Negro school.

The plan improperly placed on children and parents the burden of changing a segregated system. Brown II placed that responsibility on the School Board. Opening both schools to both races was only the beginning of the Board’s constitutional obligation, not its completion.

Issue #2

Whether a freedom-of-choice plan is inherently unconstitutional or may ever be used as a school-desegregation remedy.

Holding

A freedom-of-choice plan is not inherently unconstitutional, but it is permissible only if it effectively helps dismantle the dual system; it is not an end in itself.

Reasoning

The Court did not adopt a categorical rule that freedom of choice can never be part of a desegregation plan. In some circumstances, such a device might offer real promise of helping convert a dual system into a unitary, nonracial one.

Its validity, however, turns on practical effectiveness rather than formal neutrality. A plan that gives each student the same nominal option but leaves the schools racially identifiable does not satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment or Brown II.

If reasonably available alternatives promise a faster and more effective transition, a school board bears a heavy burden to justify choosing the less effective freedom-of-choice method. The Board’s good faith and the adequacy of its proposal must be assessed against the facts of the particular district and the feasible alternatives.

Issue #3

What obligations do district courts have when reviewing and supervising school-desegregation plans.

Holding

District courts must evaluate a plan’s real-world effectiveness, consider feasible and more promising alternatives, and retain jurisdiction until state-imposed segregation has been completely eliminated.

Reasoning

Desegregation remedies need not follow a single universal formula. Courts must examine local conditions, available options, and whether the proposed remedy promises meaningful and immediate progress toward eliminating the dual system.

In New Kent County, the absence of residential segregation, the countywide reach of both schools, and overlapping bus routes suggested that race-neutral geographic attendance zones could readily eliminate the white-school and Negro-school structure. The Court also identified school consolidation by grade level as a possible alternative for the District Court to consider on remand.

A court cannot approve a plan simply because it is facially nondiscriminatory or because officials profess good faith. It must examine how the plan works in practice, and it must keep the case under supervision until it is clear that the effects of the state-imposed dual system have been fully removed.