Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1968

Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States

391 U.S. 404 | 88 S. Ct. 1705 | 20 L. Ed. 2d 697 | 1968 U.S. LEXIS 1550

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Takeaway

In short, this case holds that Congress does not abrogate Indian treaty hunting and fishing rights through general termination language; it must make that intent clear.

Background

Under the 1854 Treaty of Wolf River, the United States confirmed a Wisconsin reservation for the Menominee Tribe "for a home, to be held as Indian lands are held." The treaty did not expressly mention hunting or fishing, but the reservation lands were selected in part because of their abundant game, and hunting and fishing were central to the Tribe's way of life.

Congress enacted the Menominee Indian Termination Act in 1954 to end federal supervision over the Tribe and its property. The termination became effective in 1961. The Act provided that state laws would thereafter apply to the Tribe and its members in the same manner as to other persons within Wisconsin's jurisdiction. Wisconsin consequently applied its hunting and fishing regulations to Menominee members and prosecuted several of them for violations.

The Tribe sued the United States in the Court of Claims, seeking compensation if the Termination Act had destroyed its treaty-based hunting and fishing rights. The Court of Claims held that the 1854 treaty included those rights but that the Termination Act had not abrogated them. The Supreme Court granted review to resolve the conflict between that ruling and a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision holding that termination had ended the rights.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the Treaty of Wolf River of 1854 conferred hunting and fishing rights on the Menominee Tribe even though it did not expressly mention them.

Holding

Yes. The treaty's grant of a reservation "to be held as Indian lands are held" included hunting and fishing rights.

Reasoning

The Court read the treaty language in light of its setting and purpose. The record showed that the Tribe chose the Wolf River lands because they contained abundant game. The treaty's essential object was to provide the Menominees a new homeland on which they could continue their accustomed way of life, including hunting and fishing.

Treaties with Indian tribes are construed as the tribes would have understood them and in favor of preserving the substance of their rights. Against that background, the general phrase that the reservation would be held as Indian lands are held carried with it the ordinary incidents of Indian life, including the right to hunt and fish on the reservation. The Court did not decide the precise scope, beneficiaries, or permissible state regulation of those rights.

Issue #2

Whether the Menominee Indian Termination Act of 1954 extinguished the Tribe's treaty-based hunting and fishing rights and subjected them entirely to Wisconsin regulation.

Holding

No. The Termination Act ended federal supervision but did not clearly abrogate the treaty hunting and fishing rights.

Reasoning

The Termination Act stated that state laws would apply to the Tribe and its members after termination, but it did not expressly mention hunting, fishing, or the 1854 treaty. Its stated purpose was the orderly termination of federal supervision over the Tribe's property and members, not the destruction of treaty property rights.

The Court read the Termination Act together with Public Law 280, enacted by the same Congress and amended shortly after the Termination Act. Public Law 280 gave Wisconsin jurisdiction over Indian country but expressly provided that nothing in it would deprive an Indian tribe or member of treaty-based hunting, trapping, or fishing rights. Because the Menominee Reservation was still Indian country when Public Law 280 took effect, the statutes were properly read in pari materia.

The reference in the Termination Act to federal "statutes" affecting Indians because of their status as Indians did not naturally include treaty rights. Treaties are distinct from statutes, and the Court refused to treat a general termination measure as an indirect or "backhanded" repeal of rights guaranteed by treaty.

Congress has power to abrogate Indian treaty rights, but an intent to do so cannot be lightly inferred. Here, no explicit language showed that Congress meant to eliminate the Tribe's rights, and it was implausible that Congress would silently destroy valuable treaty property rights while exposing the United States to a compensation claim. Senator Watkins's statement that the Act did not violate treaty obligations further supported the Court's reading.

Dissents

Justice Stewart

Reasoning

Justice Stewart, joined by Justice Black, viewed the Termination Act's text as decisive. Once termination occurred, the Act said that Wisconsin law would apply to the Menominees just as it applied to other citizens, without an exception for hunting and fishing. In his view, that unqualified command necessarily ended the Tribe's immunity from Wisconsin's game laws and therefore took the treaty rights for which compensation was due.

The dissent also found the legislative history consistent with abrogation. Congress rejected bills that would have expressly preserved hunting and fishing rights, while adopting a bill that contained no such protection. In addition, the Tribe's own counsel warned Congress that the proposed bill would abolish the treaty rights, yet Congress enacted it without adding a safeguard.

Justice Stewart rejected the majority's reliance on Public Law 280. That statute governed state jurisdiction in existing Indian country and preserved treaty hunting and fishing rights while the Menominee Reservation remained in existence. The present case, however, concerned the legal consequences after the reservation had been terminated. Under the Termination Act, Public Law 280 and other federal statutes applicable because of Indian status no longer applied to the Tribe.

For the dissent, Public Law 280 showed only that Congress knew how to preserve treaty rights expressly when it wished to do so. Because the Termination Act contained no comparable exception and made state law fully applicable after termination, Justice Stewart would have held that the treaty rights were extinguished and would have reversed the Court of Claims so that the Tribe could recover compensation.