United States v. O'Brien

On its face, the amendment does not target speech, viewpoints, demonstrations, or the communication of ideas. A person may destroy a registration card for reasons having nothing to do with expression, just as a person might destroy a driver's license or required tax records. The statute therefore does not facially abridge speech merely because some violations may occur during political protest.

The statute's terms do not single out public card burning or punish destruction undertaken to convey an antiwar message. Its coverage extends to all knowing destruction and mutilation of Selective Service certificates, so its necessary operation is not the suppression of protected expression.

The Court rejected the proposition that every act becomes protected speech whenever the actor intends to convey an idea. But it assumed, for purposes of analysis, that O'Brien's political demonstration implicated the First Amendment because expression and conduct were combined in a single act.

The Court articulated the governing test for conduct that combines speech and nonspeech elements. A regulation is justified when it is within the government's constitutional power, furthers an important or substantial governmental interest, advances an interest unrelated to suppressing expression, and restricts expression no more than is essential to further that interest.

Congress had broad constitutional authority to raise and support armies and to create a draft-registration system. Selective Service certificates served important administrative functions beyond merely informing a registrant that he had registered. They provided ready evidence of registration and classification, facilitated communication with local boards, reminded registrants to report changes in status, and helped deter or identify forgery and other misuse.

Congress therefore had a substantial interest in ensuring the continuing availability of issued certificates. That interest was not defeated by preexisting regulations requiring personal possession of the cards. The regulations and the statute covered overlapping but distinct misconduct, protected somewhat different interests, and did not prevent Congress from providing an additional statutory means of protecting the draft system.

The amendment was narrowly directed to the noncommunicative harm caused when a person deliberately makes a certificate unavailable by destroying or mutilating it. It did not prohibit O'Brien from expressing his opposition to the war or the draft through speeches, demonstrations, or other means. His conviction rested on the document's destruction, not on the viewpoint he sought to express.

The Court treated legislative motive as an inadequate basis for striking down a statute that was constitutional on its face and valid in operation. Individual legislators' statements do not reliably establish the motives of the legislature as a whole, and constitutional adjudication should not rest on speculation about what prompted particular members to vote for a law.

Cases such as Grosjean and Gomillion did not authorize invalidation based merely on illicit motive. In those cases, the laws' inevitable practical effects themselves violated constitutional rights. By contrast, the draft-card amendment did not necessarily burden expression because destroying a Selective Service certificate is not inevitably expressive conduct.

The legislative materials, if considered, also reflected an administrative concern that widespread destruction of cards could impair the Selective Service System. But the Court's principal point was that the amendment's constitutional validity did not turn on whether particular legislators also wished to deter public draft-card protests.