Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1968

St. Amant v. Thompson

390 U.S. 727 | 88 S. Ct. 1323 | 20 L. Ed. 2d 262 | 1968 U.S. LEXIS 3004

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Takeaway

In short, this case makes clear that actual malice requires proof that the speaker subjectively knew a statement was probably false or seriously doubted it; mere failure to investigate is not enough.

Background

During a 1962 campaign for public office in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Russell St. Amant delivered a televised speech concerning alleged misconduct by E. G. Partin, a Teamsters local president, and Partin's relationship with St. Amant's political opponent. St. Amant read questions and sworn answers from J. D. Albin, a dissident union member. In one answer, Albin said that Partin had connections with the sheriff's office through Deputy Sheriff Herman Thompson and that money had passed from Partin to Thompson.

Thompson sued St. Amant for defamation. The Louisiana trial court awarded Thompson $5,000. Although the trial had occurred before New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, the trial court later concluded that Sullivan's actual-malice rule did not bar the judgment. The Louisiana Court of Appeal reversed, finding insufficient proof of actual malice, but the Louisiana Supreme Court reinstated the judgment on the ground that St. Amant had recklessly disregarded the truth or falsity of the accusation.

The Supreme Court accepted, for purposes of the case, the state courts' conclusions that the statement falsely accused Thompson of criminal conduct and that Thompson, as a deputy sheriff, was a public official. The remaining question was whether Thompson had proved actual malice under New York Times.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether St. Amant's republication of Albin's accusation established actual malice because it was made with reckless disregard for whether the accusation against Deputy Sheriff Thompson was true or false.

Holding

No. Thompson did not prove that St. Amant knew the accusation was false or subjectively entertained serious doubts about its truth, as the actual-malice standard requires.

Reasoning

New York Times defines actual malice as publication with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for truth or falsity. The Court explained that reckless disregard is not an objective negligence standard. It does not turn on whether a reasonably prudent speaker would have investigated further before publishing. Rather, the evidence must support the conclusion that the defendant actually had serious doubts about the truth of the publication.

The Louisiana Supreme Court relied on St. Amant's lack of personal knowledge, his failure to investigate with other potential sources, his purported indifference to the defamatory consequences, and his mistaken belief that quoting Albin relieved him of responsibility. Those facts might show carelessness, but they did not show that St. Amant was aware that Albin's statement was probably false or that St. Amant himself doubted its truth.

A defendant cannot avoid liability merely by testifying to good faith. A factfinder may infer reckless disregard when a speaker fabricates a story, relies wholly on an unverified anonymous call, publishes allegations so inherently improbable that only a reckless person would circulate them, or has obvious reasons to doubt an informant's credibility or report. These circumstances permit an inference of subjective awareness of probable falsity.

The record did not supply such an inference here. St. Amant had known Albin for months, had verified other portions of Albin's information, and knew that Albin had sworn to his answers both in writing and before reporters. Albin also represented that he could substantiate his charges. Although Albin was involved in an internal union dispute, Thompson offered no evidence that Albin had a poor reputation for truthfulness or that St. Amant had reason, based on experience, to regard him as unreliable.

The First Amendment requires protection for some false statements about public affairs because a negligence-based duty to investigate would encourage self-censorship. The Court therefore reversed the Louisiana judgment: St. Amant's failure to investigate, without proof that he actually suspected falsity, could not satisfy the constitutional actual-malice requirement.

Concurrences

Justice Black

Reasoning

Justice Black concurred only in the judgment, relying on his separate opinions in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Garrison v. Louisiana. His position was more protective of speech than the majority's actual-malice framework: he viewed the First and Fourteenth Amendments as providing public criticism of officials an absolute constitutional protection against libel damages.

Justice Douglas

Reasoning

Justice Douglas concurred in the judgment for the reasons given in his separate opinions in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Garrison v. Louisiana. Like Justice Black, he endorsed a broader First Amendment protection for criticism of public officials than the majority's rule, rather than treating recovery as available upon proof of actual malice.

Dissents

Justice Fortas

Reasoning

Justice Fortas would have affirmed because, in his view, St. Amant's broadcast met the minimum standard of care required by New York Times. The statement was seriously libelous, accused a public official of misconduct, and was directed at a person who was not St. Amant's political opponent. St. Amant's casual use of the accusation therefore could not be excused as campaign rhetoric directed at an adversary.

Justice Fortas regarded St. Amant's complete failure to check the reliability of the accusation as reckless disregard for truth or falsity. Had St. Amant made a good-faith inquiry, Fortas would have protected him even if the statement proved false. But because St. Amant made no such check, Fortas concluded that Thompson should retain a legal remedy for a needless and false accusation of criminal conduct. In his view, the First Amendment protects sharp scrutiny of public officials, not heedless character assassination.