Whether California's procedure, under which appointed appellate counsel filed only a no-merit letter and the indigent defendant was left to present his own appeal, satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment.
Holding
No. The procedure denied the indigent appellant the equal and fair appellate representation required by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Reasoning
The Court placed the case within its line of decisions requiring meaningful equality between wealthy and indigent defendants on a first appeal as of right. Under Griffin and Douglas, a State may not give a defendant who can afford counsel the benefit of legal research, record review, and advocacy while leaving an indigent defendant, whose case has already been labeled meritless, to fend for himself.
Appointed counsel must function as an advocate for the client, not merely as an amicus curiae. Counsel's conclusory letter gave neither Anders nor the court meaningful assistance: Anders had to identify and present legal claims without a lawyer, while the court had only the unaided record rather than an advocate's analysis of possible issues and relevant authorities.
The court's own review of the record did not cure the defect. Neither California court clearly found the appeal wholly frivolous, and the process did not ensure that counsel had acted as an advocate before the appeal was resolved. The risk was concrete: Anders's pro se brief omitted a potentially important claim concerning comments on his failure to testify, an issue later addressed in Griffin v. California.