Ker v. California

Justice Clark explained that Mapp made the Fourth Amendment enforceable against the States by the same exclusionary sanction used in federal court. Mapp did not give the Supreme Court general supervisory authority over state criminal procedure, nor did it erase all state arrest and search rules. But state rules must comply with the federal constitutional floor: evidence obtained through an unreasonable search or seizure cannot be used against a defendant with standing to object.

Reasonableness remains a fact-specific constitutional inquiry rather than a fixed formula. State trial-court findings receive appropriate respect, but the Supreme Court independently examines the record when necessary to decide whether the Fourth Amendment's fundamental requirements have been honored. States may develop practical rules for law enforcement so long as those rules do not permit unreasonable searches or seizures.

The officers had watched Murphy, a known marijuana dealer, meet with Ker in circumstances closely resembling Murphy's marijuana transaction with Terrhagen the night before. Although the officers could not see contraband change hands, the similar setting, timing, and conduct reasonably supported suspicion that the Ker-Murphy meeting involved narcotics.

The surveillance evidence was reinforced by Officer Berman's information from a previously reliable informant and other sources: Ker reportedly sold marijuana from his apartment and obtained it from Murphy. Probable cause may rest on reasonably trustworthy hearsay, and the informant's information was substantially corroborated by the officers' observations. Together, these facts would warrant a person of reasonable caution in believing that Ker had committed or was committing a narcotics offense.

After the officers identified themselves, Diane Ker came from the kitchen, and Officer Berman immediately saw a large brick-shaped package of marijuana openly displayed on the kitchen sink. Her presence in the small kitchen, combined with the prominent placement of the contraband, supported an inference that she shared possession.

That inference was strengthened by the officers' prior information that George Ker used the apartment as a base for narcotics activity. The plurality therefore concluded that the officers had reasonable grounds to believe Diane Ker, as well as her husband, was committing possession of marijuana in their presence.

California Penal Code § 844 generally required officers to demand admission and explain their purpose before entering a dwelling. California courts, however, recognized an exception when compliance would increase danger or frustrate the arrest, including by allowing the destruction of readily disposable contraband. The plurality treated the state-law exception as relevant but independently considered whether the entry met federal constitutional standards.

The officers reasonably believed that Ker possessed marijuana, a substance that could quickly be flushed, hidden, or otherwise destroyed. They also had reason to act promptly: the observations establishing probable cause occurred about an hour before the arrest, and Ker's evasive driving had given officers reason to think he might anticipate police attention. On those facts, the plurality concluded that the quiet entry with a passkey, intended to prevent destruction of evidence, was not constitutionally unreasonable.

A warrantless search may be conducted incident to a lawful arrest, and the doctrine does not depend on whether the arrest itself was made under an arrest warrant. Because the plurality found both arrests lawful, it considered whether the scope and timing of the apartment search remained reasonable.

The officers had reason to move quickly rather than seek a warrant after the Ker-Murphy meeting. It was late at night, Ker had acted furtively, and the officers could reasonably fear that marijuana would be distributed, hidden, or destroyed before a warrant could be obtained. The search was also no broader than searches previously sustained incident to arrests in private residences.

The marijuana first observed on the kitchen sink was not the product of a search in the constitutional sense. Officer Berman merely walked to the open kitchen doorway after Diane Ker emerged from that room and saw contraband openly displayed. Moreover, the officers had probable cause to arrest George Ker before entering, and the California courts found that the entry was for arrest rather than as a pretext to conduct a warrantless search.

The validity of the automobile search was not properly presented in the petition for certiorari or developed in the parties' Supreme Court briefing. The record also did not show that the issue had been litigated and decided in the California courts.

The Court ordinarily does not decide constitutional questions that the parties did not properly raise or that the state courts did not adjudicate. It therefore expressed no view on whether the next-day automobile search was constitutional.