Caseflicks

Supreme Court of Virginia • 1999

Bayliner Marine Corp. v. Crow

509 S.E.2d 499 | 257 Va. 121 | 1999 Va. LEXIS 12

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Takeaway

In short, this case requires a buyer alleging warranty breach to connect a specific seller representation or a provable trade standard to the particular product purchased; personal disappointment with performance is not enough.

Background

John R. Crow considered buying Bayliner’s 3486 Trophy Convertible, an offshore sport-fishing boat, from Tidewater Yacht Agency, Bayliner’s authorized dealer in southeastern Virginia. During a brief pre-purchase ride, Crow asked salesperson John Atherton about the boat’s maximum speed. Atherton gave Crow Bayliner "prop matrixes" listing a maximum speed of 30 miles per hour for the 3486 model when equipped with specified 20x20 or 20x19 propellers. The matrix included a disclaimer that its data was comparative only and based on stated testing conditions. Atherton also showed Crow a Bayliner brochure saying the model delivered the performance needed to reach prime offshore fishing grounds.

Crow bought the boat for $120,000 and added roughly 2,000 pounds of optional equipment. His boat had a different, 20x17 propeller. At delivery, it registered a top speed of 13 miles per hour. Repairs and adjustments generally raised the speed only to 17 miles per hour, with a temporary increase to about 24 miles per hour after an engine modification. Bayliner later told Crow that the purchase-time performance representations were incorrect and that the boat’s maximum speed was 23 to 25 miles per hour.

Crow sued Bayliner, Tidewater, and the engine manufacturer. He nonsuited Tidewater, and the claim against the engine manufacturer was dismissed. After a bench trial, the trial court found that Bayliner had breached express warranties and implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. It awarded Crow $135,000 plus prejudgment interest. Bayliner appealed.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether Bayliner’s prop matrixes and sales brochure created an express warranty that Crow’s boat would reach a maximum speed of 30 miles per hour.

Holding

No. Neither the prop matrixes nor the brochure created an express warranty concerning the speed of Crow’s particular boat.

Reasoning

Under Virginia Code § 8.2-313, an affirmation of fact, promise, or description can create an express warranty if it relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain. But a seller’s mere opinion or commendation does not create a warranty. The Court distinguished Daughtrey v. Ashe, where a jeweler’s description identified the precise grade of the particular diamonds being sold.

The prop matrixes did not describe Crow’s particular boat or a boat with substantially similar features. Their 30-mile-per-hour figure applied to boats fitted with 20x20 or 20x19 propellers, while Crow’s boat had a 20x17 propeller. The published testing also assumed only about 600 pounds of passengers and gear, whereas Crow added equipment weighing about 2,000 pounds. Thus, the matrix figures could not reasonably amount to a warranty of the performance of his differently configured boat.

The brochure’s statement that the boat delivered the performance needed to reach prime offshore fishing grounds was general promotional praise. It identified no definite speed, capability, or other measurable feature. Because it was a commendation of the boat rather than a factual description of a specific characteristic, it did not expressly warrant that Crow’s boat could attain 30 miles per hour.

Issue #2

Whether Bayliner breached the implied warranty of merchantability because the boat did not attain 30 miles per hour.

Holding

No. Crow did not prove that the boat failed the trade standard of merchantability or was unfit for its ordinary purpose as an offshore sport-fishing boat.

Reasoning

Virginia Code § 8.2-314 requires merchantable goods to pass without objection in the trade and to be fit for their ordinary purposes. The first inquiry asks whether a significant segment of purchasers would object to the product, while the second asks whether the product is reasonably capable of performing its ordinary functions. A buyer claiming unmerchantability must establish the relevant standard in the trade.

Crow presented no evidence about the standard of merchantability in the offshore-fishing-boat trade. His own dissatisfaction with the boat’s speed, and Atherton’s view that it took a long time to reach fishing grounds, showed only that the boat did not meet Crow’s preferences. That evidence did not establish that a significant portion of the boat-buying public would reject an offshore fishing boat capable of traveling at 23 to 25 miles per hour.

The record also did not establish that the boat could not perform its ordinary function. Crow used it for offshore fishing during the first years after purchase, and its engines accumulated about 850 hours of operation. Although Crow attributed some use to repair and modification efforts and testified that the boat had little value to him, this did not prove that a boat with its speed capability was generally unfit for offshore sport fishing.

Issue #3

Whether Bayliner breached an implied warranty that the boat would be fit for Crow’s particular purpose of offshore fishing at a maximum speed of 30 miles per hour.

Holding

No. Crow did not establish that Bayliner knew his particular requirement that any slower boat would be unacceptable.

Reasoning

Virginia Code § 8.2-315 creates an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose when the seller has reason to know the buyer’s particular purpose and knows that the buyer is relying on the seller’s skill or judgment to select suitable goods. As a threshold matter, the buyer must make the particular purpose known to the seller.

Crow told Atherton that he intended to use the boat for offshore fishing and discussed speed in that context. But this information did not show that Atherton knew Crow required a boat capable of reaching 30 miles per hour, or that a boat unable to do so would be unacceptable to him. Because Crow did not communicate that precise, special requirement, the evidence did not support a warranty of fitness for that particular purpose.