Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1959

San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon

359 U.S. 236 | 79 S. Ct. 773 | 3 L. Ed. 2d 775 | 1959 U.S. LEXIS 1819

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Takeaway

In short, this case established the Garmon preemption rule: States generally may not regulate or award damages for conduct arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA, even when the NLRB declines to act, absent narrow exceptions such as violence or deeply rooted local concerns.

Background

In 1953, the unions asked Garmon, a lumber and building-materials business, to sign an agreement requiring it to employ only union members or employees who applied for membership within thirty days. Garmon refused because its employees had not selected a union as their bargaining representative. The unions then peacefully picketed Garmon's business and pressured its customers and suppliers to stop dealing with it. The trial court found that the purpose was to force Garmon to sign the proposed agreement, rather than merely to organize employees.

A California trial court enjoined the unions from picketing or using other pressure to secure the agreement before they were designated bargaining representatives, and awarded Garmon $1,000 in damages. Although Garmon had initiated an NLRB representation proceeding, the Board's Regional Director declined jurisdiction under the Board's monetary standards. The California Supreme Court initially upheld both the injunction and damages award.

On the case's first trip to the Supreme Court, the Court held that the NLRB's refusal to exercise jurisdiction did not restore state power over conduct otherwise preempted by federal labor law. It vacated and remanded because the basis for the damages award under California law was unclear. On remand, the California Supreme Court set aside the injunction but sustained damages, treating the unions' conduct as a state-law tort based on an unfair labor practice. The Supreme Court again granted review to decide whether California could award damages for peaceful union conduct it could not enjoin.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether a State may regulate conduct that is arguably protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act or arguably prohibited as an unfair labor practice by § 8.

Holding

No. When conduct is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8, state courts and federal courts must defer to the National Labor Relations Board's primary and exclusive competence.

Reasoning

Congress created a comprehensive national labor-relations system and entrusted its primary administration to the NLRB. Federal preemption in this field protects not only uniform substantive rules, but also the Board's specialized procedures and administrative judgment. Allowing states to make their own initial determinations would invite conflicting legal standards, remedies, and enforcement systems.

The Court therefore focuses on potential conflict, not merely a demonstrated conflict in the particular case. State courts are not the primary tribunals for deciding whether disputed labor activity falls within § 7's protections or § 8's prohibitions. If conduct is arguably covered, the risk that state regulation will frustrate national labor policy is sufficient to require deference to the Board.

California's adjudication rested on the premise that the unions' conduct was an unfair labor practice. But whether the peaceful picketing and economic pressure were protected, prohibited, or outside the Act was for the NLRB to decide in the first instance. Because the activity was at least arguably within §§ 7 or 8, California lacked jurisdiction to regulate it.

Issue #2

Whether the NLRB's decision not to assert jurisdiction permits a State to regulate conduct that would otherwise be preempted.

Holding

No. The Board's refusal to exercise jurisdiction does not return preempted labor matters to state control.

Reasoning

Under Guss v. Utah Labor Relations Board and the Court's earlier decision in this litigation, the Board's nonassertion of jurisdiction does not create a state-law gap that States may fill. The governing concern is not whether the Board will actually adjudicate the dispute, but whether the disputed activity lies in an area Congress committed to the federal labor scheme.

Only a clear Board determination that the conduct is neither protected nor prohibited, or controlling precedent applied to essentially undisputed facts, can remove the uncertainty that requires deference. A declination of jurisdiction, a refusal by the General Counsel to issue a complaint, or another disposition that does not clearly classify the conduct does not authorize state action.

Issue #3

Whether California could avoid preemption by awarding damages for completed peaceful union activity rather than enjoining that activity.

Holding

No. A state damages remedy is preempted just as an injunction is when it regulates conduct arguably covered by §§ 7 or 8.

Reasoning

An award of damages is a powerful means of controlling conduct. The prospect of liability can regulate labor activity as effectively as an injunction, so permitting state damages would create the same danger of conflicting regulation that bars state preventive relief.

The fact that the NLRB may lack authority to provide the same compensatory remedy does not save California's judgment. Remedies are part of an integrated regulatory system, and a State cannot impose a remedy for conduct that federal labor law leaves to the Board's primary determination.

The Court recognized narrow exceptions for conduct involving violence, threats of violence, and imminent threats to public order, because States have a deeply rooted interest in preserving domestic peace. Those exceptions did not apply here: the unions' conduct was peaceful economic pressure, not violence or intimidation.

Concurrences

Justice Harlan

Reasoning

Justice Harlan, joined by Justices Clark, Whittaker, and Stewart, concurred only on a narrow ground. In his view, the union activity could fairly be considered protected under the Taft-Hartley Act. Because protected conduct is necessarily beyond state power, California had to refrain from acting unless the NLRB first made a contrary determination. The Board's decision not to exercise jurisdiction did not alter that conclusion.

He disagreed with the majority's broader account of state damages actions. He read United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp. and United Automobile Workers v. Russell as permitting States to award tort damages for past, nonviolent conduct that is not federally protected, even if that conduct may be federally prohibited. In his view, those decisions rested principally on the absence of a conflicting federal damages remedy, not on the violent character of the conduct alone.

Justice Harlan warned that the majority's rule would substantially eliminate state remedies for nonviolent labor torts. Under the majority's approach, injured parties may have to wait for Board action, may receive inadequate relief because the Board's reparations authority is limited, or may receive no relief at all when the Board declines jurisdiction. He would preserve state authority where conduct is neither protected nor prohibited by federal law and would maintain a distinction between state damages actions and injunctions.