Caseflicks

Supreme Court of the United States • 1955

Brown v. Board of Education

349 U.S. 294 | 75 S. Ct. 753 | 99 L. Ed. 2d 1083 | 1955 U.S. LEXIS 734 | 71 Ohio Law. Abs. 584 | 99 L. Ed. 1083 | 57 Ohio Op. 253

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Takeaway

In short, Brown II turned Brown I's constitutional command into a remedial framework: local courts had to supervise good-faith desegregation, beginning promptly and proceeding with "all deliberate speed."

Background

In Brown I, decided May 17, 1954, the Supreme Court held that racial segregation in public education violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court reserved the question of remedy and ordered further argument because the cases arose in different local settings and presented practical problems in dismantling segregated school systems.

The consolidated cases came from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. The judgments below were reversed except for the Delaware judgment, which had ordered the immediate admission of the student plaintiffs to formerly white-only schools. The Court then considered what decrees and procedures should govern implementation of Brown I's constitutional rule.

Issues

Issue #1

Whether the constitutional prohibition on school segregation required immediate admission of Black children to formerly white schools, or permitted a transitional period for dismantling segregated systems.

Holding

The Court did not require uniform immediate desegregation in every case, but required defendants to make a prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance and to achieve admission to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis "with all deliberate speed."

Reasoning

Brown I established a controlling constitutional principle: state and local laws requiring or permitting racial discrimination in public education must yield. The Court stressed that disagreement with the constitutional rule could not justify delaying or denying its enforcement.

At the same time, the Court recognized that converting entrenched segregated systems could entail varied local problems involving school facilities, transportation, staffing, attendance areas, district boundaries, and revisions to local laws and regulations. Equity permits courts to shape practical remedies that account for those conditions while protecting the plaintiffs' right to nondiscriminatory school admission as soon as practicable.

The required flexibility was not a license for resistance. Defendants had to make a prompt and reasonable start, and they bore the burden of proving that any additional time was necessary in the public interest and consistent with good-faith compliance at the earliest practicable date.

Issue #2

Whether the Supreme Court should prescribe detailed nationwide desegregation decrees or remand the cases for local implementation and supervision.

Holding

The Court remanded the cases to the lower courts to formulate and enforce appropriate equitable decrees, while requiring those courts to retain jurisdiction during the transition.

Reasoning

Local school authorities had primary responsibility for identifying and solving the practical problems of transition. Courts closest to the affected communities were better positioned to assess local conditions, conduct any needed hearings, and determine whether school officials were acting in good faith.

The Court relied on the traditional flexibility of equity, which allows courts to adjust remedies to reconcile public and private interests. On remand, the lower courts were to evaluate the adequacy of proposed desegregation plans and enter orders necessary to bring about racially nondiscriminatory admission.

The Delaware judgment ordering immediate admission was affirmed because it already accorded with Brown I's constitutional principle. It was nevertheless remanded to the Delaware Supreme Court for any further proceedings needed in light of the Court's remedial guidance.