Coleman v. Miller

The Kansas Supreme Court had entertained the legislators' mandamus action, but its determination of who could sue did not alone establish federal jurisdiction. The federal questions arose under Article V, which exclusively governs the constitutional amendment process, so the Supreme Court had to decide independently whether the petitioners had a sufficient stake to invoke its review.

The twenty senators who voted against ratification alleged more than a generalized interest in constitutional compliance. If the Lieutenant Governor lacked authority to cast a deciding vote, their twenty votes would have defeated the ratification resolution. The state court's contrary ruling therefore allegedly nullified the practical effect of votes that otherwise would have been decisive.

The Court distinguished cases denying standing to citizens, taxpayers, or officials asserting only a broad public interest. It relied particularly on Hawke v. Smith and Leser v. Garnett, which allowed review of state-court decisions concerning federal constitutional amendments when state law authorized the underlying action. The senators' immediate interest in the effectiveness of their votes was, in the Court's view, sufficient.

The petitioners argued that the Lieutenant Governor, despite serving as presiding officer of the Kansas Senate, was not part of the "Legislature" authorized by Article V to ratify a proposed federal amendment. The Kansas Supreme Court had held that he could cast the tie-breaking vote.

The Supreme Court divided evenly over the threshold question whether this dispute about the Lieutenant Governor's role presented a judicially decidable controversy or a political question. Because an equally divided Court could not resolve that question, the Kansas judgment was not disturbed on this ground and the Court announced no governing rule.

Article V speaks to ratification by three-fourths of the states but says nothing about rejection, withdrawal of ratification, or the effect of either action on a state's later authority to ratify. Congress likewise had enacted no statute directing courts to treat a prior rejection as permanently exhausting a state's power.

The Court regarded the Fourteenth Amendment's ratification history as instructive. Political branches had accepted ratifications from states that had previously rejected the amendment and had treated attempted withdrawals of ratification as ineffective. That historical settlement supported leaving these questions to the political departments rather than deciding them judicially.

The Secretary of State's statutory role presupposed receiving official notice that a state legislature had ratified an amendment. Nothing in the Constitution or statutes authorized a court to prevent Kansas officials from certifying their ratification before the political branches could address its effect.

Dillon v. Gloss held that Congress may prescribe a reasonable deadline for ratification and indicated that Article V contemplates ratification within a reasonable time. But Dillon involved an amendment for which Congress had expressly fixed a seven-year period; it did not decide that courts should supply and enforce a deadline when Congress had chosen not to do so.

Determining whether an amendment remains vital would require assessments of changing political, social, and economic conditions, public sentiment, and the continuing need for the proposed change. The Court concluded that such judgments lack manageable legal standards and are unsuitable for ordinary judicial factfinding.

Congress is institutionally equipped to make that judgment when it controls the promulgation of an amendment after receiving the requisite certified state ratifications. Congress's determination that an amendment was validly adopted within a reasonable time would be final and not subject to judicial review.