IN RE the MARRIAGE OF Delinda EVANS, and Kenneth Evans

Appellate jurisdiction generally extends only to final, appealable orders—orders that end the action and leave nothing further to determine the parties' rights. Piecemeal review is disfavored, including review of magistrates' orders.

The January 2019 judicial-review order adopted some parts of the magistrate's ruling but rejected the PEI allocation and remanded for further statutory findings. Because that remand left the property issue unresolved, neither the February 2018 order nor the January 2019 order was final. The case became final only when the judge adopted the post-remand order in May 2020.

Under C.R.M. 7(a)(5), a party had twenty-one days to seek review of the magistrate's order. The twenty-first day after the February 3 order fell on Sunday, February 24.

The Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure extend a deadline that falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday to the next business day. Thus, the filing deadline moved to Monday, February 25, the day Kenneth filed his petition.

C.R.C.P. 16.2 imposes an affirmative duty of full and honest financial disclosure in domestic-relations cases. Under In re Marriage of Hunt, a spouse cannot be treated as having knowingly waived further investigation when the other spouse withheld information the rule required that spouse to disclose.

Kenneth admittedly knew PEI existed but did not disclose it, furnish PEI records, or reveal his claimed ownership during the dissolution or settlement negotiations. Delinda therefore lacked information to which she was entitled when she agreed to halt the business evaluation.

The agreement itself reinforced that conclusion. It was expressly premised on full disclosure, made the agreement void as to assets not fully disclosed, and preserved the court's authority to divide subsequently discovered assets. The broad clause awarding Kenneth other businesses he operated could not override those terms or excuse his nondisclosure.

On review, the court could not overturn the magistrate's factual findings unless clearly erroneous. The magistrate was entitled to resolve conflicting evidence and assess witness credibility, even where testimony was uncontradicted.

Although Kenneth and former employee Cody Salyards testified that Salyards owned PEI at the relevant time, the documents offered to establish that ownership, including stock certificates and corporate minutes, were unsigned drafts. The magistrate reasonably found that evidence unpersuasive.

Kenneth's signed 2013 tax return listed him as PEI's 100% owner, and Secretary of State filings identified him as its incorporator. This evidence supported the finding that he owned PEI during the dissolution proceedings. Because PEI was a marital asset that he did not disclose, Delinda was entitled to seek relief under Rule 16.2(e)(10).

The rule authorized a motion to reallocate assets and liabilities based on a material misstatement or omission. The Colorado Supreme Court's description of the rule in In re Marriage of Durie indicated that the court may allocate the material assets or liabilities that were omitted or misstated.

Here, the magistrate allocated PEI alone and did not revisit the original division of other property. Because the case did not require deciding whether the rule might ever permit a complete reallocation, the court expressly declined to resolve that broader question.

The Rule 16.2(e)(10) hearing is the first proceeding in which the omitted asset is valued and equitably divided. Section 14-10-113 therefore governs that allocation and requires consideration of relevant factors, including each spouse's contribution to marital property, property already set apart to each spouse, and their economic circumstances.

Section 14-10-113(5) separately requires valuation of marital property as of the decree date, or the date of the property hearing if it preceded the decree. The magistrate complied by valuing PEI as of the 2013 decree.

But the statute requires consideration of economic circumstances when the property division becomes effective. For a post-decree allocation of an omitted asset, that means the circumstances at the Rule 16.2(e)(10) hearing, not only those existing at the original decree. Using only the 2013 circumstances could let the nondisclosing spouse retain the benefit of the asset's success and produce an inequitable windfall.

The magistrate properly applied these principles. She equally divided PEI after finding that Kenneth continued to own and operate it and that the parties' financial circumstances had diverged sharply since the decree. Delinda's contributions as homemaker and parent also supported an equal share of a business developed during the marriage.

Because the parties' combined monthly income exceeded the top level of the statutory child-support guidelines, the court had discretion to set support after considering all relevant statutory factors. Even so, it had to make findings sufficiently specific to permit appellate review.

The magistrate found the parties' incomes, their affluent marital lifestyle, and their testimony about children's expenses, but did not explain how those facts yielded $12,000 per month. The appellate court could not determine whether the award rested on a permissible calculation.

The record also suggested that the magistrate may have placed the children's full financial needs on Kenneth, despite the statutory principle that both parents share the support obligation. On remand, the court may again make any modified award retroactive if authorized by the applicable child-support statutes.

Section 14-10-118(2) authorizes a court to require security to ensure enforcement of its orders, but security must be reasonable in both amount and duration. Security greatly exceeding the obligation it secures is confiscatory rather than protective.

The magistrate required Kenneth to pay at least $50,000 per month toward Delinda's PEI award and imposed a lien on all of his interests in PEI, Overlook, and any other assets in his name. Yet the magistrate made no findings explaining why that sweeping lien or the required security was necessary.

On remand, any security order must be supported by explicit findings, be reasonable in amount and duration, and relate to Kenneth's financial obligations to Delinda. A party need not formally move for security before the court may order it.

Section 14-10-119 permits an award of attorney fees based on the parties' relative abilities to pay, considering their overall economic circumstances. A substantial disparity in income and resources may support apportioning fees to the spouse better able to pay.

The magistrate found that Delinda earned approximately $3,432 monthly while Kenneth earned at least $394,000 monthly. Delinda had incurred $92,691.75 in attorney and expert fees and had already paid $30,000. Those findings supported requiring Kenneth to pay the unpaid balance.

The magistrate also found that the supplemental proceedings and resulting fees would not have been necessary if Kenneth had disclosed PEI as Rule 16.2 required. The court could consider that conduct because the award primarily equitably apportioned fees rather than punished Kenneth.